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PERSONNEL AND PERSONALITIES IN NORTH CHINA IN THE EARLY MONGOL PERIOD *

BY

IGOR DE RACHEWILTZ

Introduction ¹⁾

The investigation of periods of political and cultural transition following the collapse of an important dynasty and the major breakdown of the administrative machinery—a recurrent and universal phenomenon—is essential for the proper understanding of a country's institutional history. It is in these confused and often chaotic periods, when the wind of change blows stronger, that the cultural foundations of the country are truly put to the test. They may be shattered to such a degree by political events that a particular civilization comes to an end; they may, on the other hand, be shaken to a greater or lesser extent yet the civilization survives. However, even when it does survive, a new institutional pattern is bound to emerge once the political crisis is over and national unity is re-established.

In her long history, China has had several such periods of disunion. It also has a unique record of cultural survival—a fact which, among others, has prompted the superficial observer to develop the myth of an “unchanging China”. From the fourth century onwards, these periods coincide with foreign invasions, and the internal collapse is either the cause or one of the main effects of the invasions.

The relationship between political instability in China and the activity of the “barbarians” has been the object of many important investigations during the past two or three decades. In the West, O. Lattimore—a pioneer in the field—W. Eberhard, and K. A. Wittfogel have thrown considerable light on the interaction of Chinese and

*) Paper presented at the conference on “Chinese Institutional Change, 750-1350”, held in Chicago on September 1-4, 1965.

1) Unless otherwise specified, the editions used are *Po-na* for the standard histories, and *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* for literary texts.

barbarian rule, the pattern of barbarian conquest, and the assimilation or acculturation of the barbarians. As a result, a number of long-held beliefs, such as the claim that China has invariably absorbed the barbarian conquerors, have been substantially modified.

On the whole it is true, however, that the periods of disunion and foreign rule did not weaken China's culture; on the contrary, she came out enriched and strengthened, both culturally and politically. But in the process of coping with the barbarians, her own outlook, customs, and institutions were sensibly affected. In the early Middle Ages the progress of Buddhism, one of the major factors in Chinese intellectual, social and economic history, was due to a large extent to the patronage and encouragement of the alien Northern Dynasties. The important social and economic changes that took place in the same period in the south were also a *contre-coup* of the foreign invasions. The syncretic intellectual and religious climate bequeathed by the Northern Wei was, in turn, an indirect factor in the formation of Sui ideology and T'ang culture. The character of the Sung state, as a recent investigation has shown, was determined less by the actions of its founders than by the important changes of the Wu-tai period¹). The reforms introduced by the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were felt long after the fall of the Yüan dynasty. The administrative and fiscal policies inaugurated by the Mongol rulers had the effect of strengthening the power of the centralized state to an unprecedented degree. "The state," writes H. F. Schurmann, "became so all powerful that never again — until recent times — did China disintegrate as it had so often in the past."²)

The native Confucian-oriented historians have normally underrated the role of the barbarian dynasties, and the periods of disunion, far from being regarded as significant formative periods, have never ceased to bother the traditional scholar preoccupied with ethico-

1) Wang Gungwu, *The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties* (Kuala Lumpur, 1963).

2) H. F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century", *HJAS* 19 (1956), 389.

chronological issues and the problem of dynastic legitimacy.¹⁾

One serious difficulty for the student of institutional changes who wishes to investigate these “depressed areas” of Chinese history, is the unevenness and heterogeneity of the source material. Up to the tenth and eleventh centuries he has to rely almost entirely on the official histories, with all their biases and limitations. From then on the source material increases in size and variety: private records, epigraphies and gazetteers, all adding valuable information. On reaching the fourteenth century one is literally overwhelmed by the mass of available documents. These four hundred odd years saw the progressive conquest of China by new and more ambitious barbarian dynasties: the Liao, the Chin and the Yüan. Although the sources on Liao history are rather limited compared with those on Chin and, particularly, on Yüan history, the wealth of information that they are capable of yielding when subjected to close scrutiny has been clearly shown by Wittfogel and Feng in their monumental work.²⁾

As for the Chin and the Yüan, they are also increasingly attracting the attention of scholars. Because of the dual character of these dynasties, the institutional changes wrought by their alien emperors must be viewed from both the historical and sociological angle, and a great deal of spade work in either field remains to be done.³⁾ In the case of the Yüan, a major obstacle for the investigator is the incredible diversity of the sources, the use of which requires a knowledge seldom found in one person alone. Texts in classical and thirteenth century vernacular Chinese must be used concurrently with works in Mongolian, Persian, Arabic, Armenian, Russian and several other European languages, and, of course, Japanese. The standard history of the Yüan, although

1) Cf. O. B. van der Sprenkel, “Chronographie et historiographie chinoises”, *Mél. Inst. H. Et. Chin.* 14 (1960), 407-21. See also Wang Gungwu, 1-3.

2) K. A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, *History of Chinese Society. Liao (907-1125)* (Philadelphia, 1949).

3) An important investigation of the political structure of Jurchen pre-dynastic society by Mikami Tsugio has appeared in *Tōkyō daigaku kyōyōgakubu kiyō* 11 (1956), 87-132. An interesting collection of studies on various aspects of Chin history is found in Toyama Gunji's *Kinchōshi kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1964).

indispensable, is a poor compilation, particularly for the period covering the first four reigns (Cinggis, Ögödei, Güyüg and Möngke, 1206-1259). More often than not the information one needs is found in the bulky collected works of contemporary scholars, in inscriptions and in other subsidiary sources.¹⁾

Nevertheless, the Yüan (taken *sensu lato* from 1206 to 1368) is an ideal period for the study of social and institutional change. It presents a unique interest insofar as it is the only case of a nomadic people ruling over the whole of China; moreover, it is the only nomadic culture on whose pre-dynastic social structure and customs we are well informed.²⁾ One of the most interesting problems for the *Yüan-chia* is that concerning the beginnings of Mongol rule in China. Well before Qubilai completed the conquest of Southern Sung, the illiterate Mongol nomads had somehow succeeded in setting up an extremely complex bureaucratic machinery and a system of government which were a marvel to the foreign visitor. Obviously great changes must have occurred in the two societies, the Mongolian and the Chinese, between 1211, the year Cinggis attacked North China, and 1260, when Qubilai was elected emperor. The question is: "What kind of changes took place, how were they brought about, and by whom?" Our sources do not provide a ready answer. It is through a painstaking gathering and sifting of data scattered throughout official compilations, biographies and *wen-chi* that we can reconstruct the picture. It will take several years to complete the task, but we can already isolate certain factors.

Starting from the truism that institutions are inseparable from human activity, I have set out to investigate the lives and activities of some sixty individuals (mostly Chinese and Khitan) who played an important

1) E.g., Sung and Yüan gazetteers, whose importance as primary sources cannot be underestimated. For an index of biographies contained in these gazetteers see Chu Shih-chia *Sung Yüan fang-chih chuan-chi so-yin* (Peking, 1963). See also Chang Kuo-kan, *Chung-kuo ku fang-chih k'ao* (Peking, 1962).

2) Through the *Secret History of the Mongols* and the works of the Persian historians. Cf. B. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols. Le féodalisme nomade*, trans. by M. Carsow (Paris, 1948), Introduction. See also H. F. Schurmann, *Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), I, Section A, Introduction.

political and military role in the first decades of the conquest. Most of them have a biography in the *Yüan-shih*, and for several of them we have additional information in Accounts of Conduct (*hsing-chuan*) and various funerary inscriptions. I have of course made use of all the other sources available to me, as well as of special studies by modern scholars. My immediate purpose was to find out not only who were the key figures involved in the Sino-Mongol cultural exchange, but how they operated within the Sino-Mongol context, how they gradually modified it, what were their aims, how and where they succeeded or failed. This may help in gauging to some extent the influence of the Mongol impact on Chinese society and, conversely, the degree of sinification of Mongolian customs and practices in the early phase of the conquest¹). This is just the beginning of what promises to be a long journey.

The Background

In the *Yüan-shih* (87, 1a) we read: "At the beginning of the state (=dynasty), there was not yet an official system. At the head [of the administration] stood the judge (*tuan-shih-kuan*), who was called *jarγuci*. He decided all matters of state." Another passage of the same work (85, 1a) mentions alongside the judges, "who are in charge of civil and criminal [affairs]", the myriarchs (*wan-hu*) in charge of the army. According to this text, only "one or two intimate and respected ministers" were holding these positions in Cinggis Qan's time. A few chapters later (98, 1b), the *Yüan-shih*, describing the military organization at the beginning of the dynasty, mentions the *wan-hu* as well as the chiliarchs (*ch'ien-hu*) and the centurions (*pai-hu*). In the section on the Yüan military system in the *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* (41, 58b), we further learn that the places garrisoned by *wan-hu* and *ch'ien-hu* were divided into "left" and "right". The same succinct description of the early official

1) In this connection it would be interesting to compare the Sino-Mongol situation with the Sino-Khitan culture contacts in the tenth century, and the Sino-Jurchen relations in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in order to test Wittfogel's theory about the different degrees of acculturation of these people.

system is found in other Yüan sources.¹⁾ All these works stress the primitive and military character of the Mongol state at the time of Cinggis Qan, when, as T'ao Tsung-i (?1320-?1401) writes, "the court was set up in rough form, and the official system was simple and traditional."²⁾

According to the generally accepted view, it was only in 1230-31, i.e. at the beginning of Ögödei's reign (1229-41), that the Mongols, under the influence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243), set up a rudimentary administration *à la chinoise* in North China.³⁾

A perusal of the *Secret History* and of the biographies in the *Yüan-shih* shows that the above statements rather oversimplify the situation. The Mongol regime, although essentially a military one, was a complex organization. Furthermore, from the very beginning of the invasion of the Chin kingdom, the Mongols appear to have made use of traditional Chinese forms of local government, bureaucratic organization, and official ranks and titles. Practically any biography of Chinese, Khitan, and Jurchen officials in the Mongol service will supply ample evidence of this. It would seem, then, that the Mongol leaders had either a prior knowledge of Chinese culture and institutions, or that they acquired it in an amazingly short time and made use of it during their campaign against Chin.

Since, so far, the majority of works devoted to the foreign dynasties have emphasized the barbarism of the Mongols, their lack of adaptability to Chinese culture, and generally the anti-Han aspect of their policies, it might be worth-while to have a closer look at this question. It would be naive to believe that the Mongols were not acquainted with conditions in China before they launched their attack on

1) E.g., T'ao Tsung-i's *Cho-keng lu* 1, 22b.

2) *Ibid.* The passage has been translated by Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices", 322.

3) Cf. P. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan* (Paris, 1937), viii, xxv, 118; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 65 ff., 88 ff., 213 ff. On Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai see also my articles "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman", in *Confucian Personalities* ed. by A. F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford, 1962), 189-216, 359-67; and "The *Hsi-yu lu* by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai" in *Monumenta Serica* 21 (1962), 1-128.

Chin in 1211. In fact, Cinggis Qan must have had a fairly good knowledge of the country long before he planned to conquer it. Most of the nomadic peoples of Mongolia must have known something about it, either through trade and political alliance (particularly the southern and eastern tribes), or by oral traditions. As regards the tribe to which Cinggis' clan belonged, the "Mongols" proper, we know that it had relations with the Jurchens some decades before Cinggis was born. One of its first khans, Qabul, had even been a guest at the Chin court in the early part of the twelfth century.¹⁾ At that time, the Mongol tribe was still a tributary of the Jurchens,²⁾ but the situation soon changed. No doubt owing to the leading position which the Mongols assumed in the steppe society, a break occurred between them and the Chin in 1135, followed by a series of unsuccessful Jurchen military expeditions into Mongolia.³⁾ Peace was eventually bought by the Chin court in 1146. The first Mongol confederation did not last long, however. It came to an end a few years later partly as a result of attacks by other tribes, notably the Tatar who had Jurchen support, and partly through internal dissension.⁴⁾

1) Rašid-ad-din, *Sbornik letopisei*, I, 2, trans. by O. I. Smirnova (Moscow, 1952), 37.

2) Referring to pre-Cinggis Qan's times, Juwaini says that the Jurchens used to "demand and seize goods" from the Mongols. See 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juwaini, *The History of the World Conqueror*, trans. by J. A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), 21.

3) On these and the following events see the Chinese sources quoted by Wang Kuo-wei in his *Meng-ku k'ao* (Hai-ning Wang Ching-an hsien-sheng i-shu ed.), 5b ff.; *Ta-ta k'ao* (*ibid.*), 25b ff.; Rašid-ad-din, 42 ff.; P. Pelliot, *Histoire secrète des Mongols* (Paris, 1949—hereafter referred to as *Secret History*), §§ 52 ff.

4) It is not true, however, that the Mongols were defeated in 1161 by combined Jurchen-Tatar forces near the Büir-nor as stated by R. Grousset in *L'empire des steppes* (Paris, 1939), 253 and *L'empire Mongol* (Paris, 1941), 47, and after him by Boyle in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition by B. Lewis and others (Leiden-London, 1960-), s.v. "Čingiz-khān". This error originates from a misinterpretation of a statement by W. Barthold in his *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (London, 2nd. ed., 1958), 381-2. Barthold mentioned a proclamation of the Chin ruler (i.e. Hai-ling Wang, 1149-61), expressing his intention to chastize the Mongols and the Tatars, or the Mongol-Tatars, to which Palladii had referred in his *Starinnoe mongol'skie skazanie o Čingiz-khane*, *Tr. Čl. Ross. Dukh. Miss. v Pek.* 4 (1866), 173. However, this was never carried out. See Wang Kuo-wei's remarks in *Meng-ku k'ao*, 8a-b. The full text of the proclamation is found in the *San-cb'ao pei-meng hui-pien* by Hsü Meng-hsin (Hai-t'ien shu-tien ed.), *IV* (J), 355-6.

By the time Cinggis was born (1167?) a deep enmity existed between the Mongol clans and the Tatars. Cinggis (then only Temüjin) must have learned quite early about his family's feud with the Tatars, who were responsible for the death of some of his ancestors as well as of his own father, and he was surely aware of the Tatars' friendly relations with the Jurchens of China.¹⁾ In the next twenty years, which saw his steady rise to tribal leadership, he must have learned a great deal more about the Chin, in the same way as the Jurchens came to know about him. When, towards the close of the century (1196?), the Chin court decided to attack their former allies, the Tatars, it was to him and to Toyril, the khan of the Kereits, that they turned for assistance. The Tatars were defeated by their joint forces, whereupon the Chin general, on behalf of emperor Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208), rewarded Toyril with the title of *wang* "king" and Cinggis with the lesser title of *ja'ut-quri*, "chief of hundreds".

It is worth noting, incidentally, that the former title is purely Chinese, while the latter is an Altaic, either Khitan or a hybrid Mongol-Khitan, appellation.²⁾ Ong-qan, the actual name by which Toyril was later known, is another example of a hybrid term (*ong*=Ch. *wang*). In this connection it is necessary to mention that besides Altaic titles the pre-dynastic Mongols used, as both titles and proper names, official designations of Chinese origin, some of which they had no doubt inherited from their Khitan predecessors.³⁾

1) The *Chin-shih* (7, 2a), records that in the fourth month of 1172 the Tatars sent tribute to the Chin court. Cf. also *Ta-ta k'ao*, 27a.

2) Cf. P. Pelliot et L. Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan, Cheng-wou ts'in-tcheng lou*, I (Leiden, 1951), 203-7; P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I (Paris, 1959), 291-5.

3) Since Han times it had been a common practice for the Chinese court to bestow honorific titles on barbarian chieftains in reward for their loyalty and services. Titles so conferred were, of course, regarded by the Chinese as of lesser value than the same titles given to their own subjects, and this applies particularly to the title of *wang* (cf. Pelliot et Hambis, 206). Such titles passed into the official nomenclature of the nomadic societies, being usually Altaicized in the process. Thus, *chiang-chün* "general" became the *sengün* of the Orkhon Turks; *ling-kung*, the common designation for the chief of the grand secretariat (*chung-shu-ling*), passed into Khitan and thence into Mongolian as *lingqum*; the well known *taiši* of the early Mongol period goes

In the years immediately following the successful campaign against the Tatars, the position of Cinggis *vis-à-vis* the Chin court was one of outward submission. It was now the Mongols who sent tribute to Chung-tu (Peking).¹⁾ Cinggis, undoubtedly, resented this formal subjection to the traditional enemies of his people; yet he would have been unwise to act differently while he was still consolidating his power in Mongolia. Ten years later, at the famous *quriltai* of 1206, he was elected supreme leader of all the tribes. Certainly, it must now have become unbearable for the universal khan to continue paying homage to the Chin emperor. However, time was not ripe yet for an open conflict. There were still some recalcitrant tribes in Western Mongolia to bring to reason, the Hsi-Hsia of Kansu and Ninghsia had to be neutralized, and the Öngüt “guardians of the frontier”—the important Turkic Nestorian tribe of Inner Mongolia allied to Chin—had to be won over to the conqueror’s cause.

Already at this time Cinggis could rely on Chin defectors and captives to gain information on the state of affairs in the south. Although this significant fact is mentioned in the *Yüan-shih* (I, 14b-15a) s.a. 1206, no names are given. We know, however, that among the former Chin subjects in his service were two Khitan brothers, Yeh-lü A-hai (*Aqai) and T’u-hua (*Tuqa), originally from Huan-chou (north of modern

back also to the Liao, or even earlier, where it rendered either *t’ai-tzu* “imperial prince” or *t’ai-shih* “grand preceptor”, and so on. See Pelliot in *TP* 37 (1942-4), 54, 82; *JA* 232 (1940-1), 5 n. 1; Pelliot et Hambis, 149-51. Cf. also Cleaves in *HJAS* 25 (1964-5), 55-6 n. 32. Some of these titles even reappeared in a new Chinese garb during the periods of barbarian rule in China. The Liao title *hsiang-wen* was, in all likelihood, a Chinese transcription of the Khitan form of the original Chinese term *hsiang-kung* “His Excellency the Minister”. As a proper name it is attested among the Mongols of the twelfth century in the form Senggüm. See the *Secret History* § 142 *et passim*; *TP* 27 (1930), 45-6 n. 3; *Notes on Marco Polo, II* (Paris, 1963), 825-6. Cf. Wang Min-hsin’s article “Liao-shih ‘Ch’i-tan yü kuan-ming tsa-k’ao’”, *Yu-shih hsüeh-pao* 4 (1961), for this and other Khitan titles. In the same period we also find among the Naimans of the Altai two other names which were originally Chinese titles: Guyang (< *kuo-wang* “prince of state”) and Tayang (< *t’ai-wang* “great prince”). See *TP* 37, 39 n. 3, and Pelliot et Hambis, 364. On hybrid Sino-Mongol names and terms see *below*, pp. 136-7, n. 2.

1) See the *Yüan-shih* I, 15b, where it is stated that he sent yearly tributes to the Chin.

Hsüan-hua hsien, Chahar). They had been sent by Chang-tsung as envoys to Toyrl, at whose camp they had met the future Cinggis Qan for the first time. They soon decided to side with him, and we find them listed among the followers who participated in the fateful Baljuna "covenant" of 1203. A-hai, who was born about 1150, must have been well over forty when he joined Cinggis. Unfortunately we are not informed about his previous career under the Chin. T'u-hua, the younger brother, had been chief of the Huan-chou garrison. The two brothers were well acquainted with conditions in North China and particularly in the frontier region, as we shall presently see. Both will play a major role in the Sino-Mongol relations.¹⁾ Moreover, since Cinggis had already been in contact with the Öngüt chiefs for quite some time, and his earlier raids in Tangut territory had yielded prisoners,²⁾ he had ample sources of information and means of counter-checking it. After he had disposed of the last resistance in Mongolia and strengthened his ties with the Öngüt, Cinggis attacked Hsi-Hsia in 1209 and forced the king to conclude peace and acknowledge himself as a vassal of the Mongols.

Cinggis was now ready to attack Chin. In order to prepare the ground for hostilities he had stopped sending the usual tribute two years earlier, knowing, presumably from his informers, that the Jurchens were too busy with their war against Sung to organize a punitive expedition against him. Cinggis' strength and intentions were well known at the Chin court, and disgruntled officials had already begun changing

1) On them see the biographies in *Yüan-shih* 150, 9a-10a and 149, 22b-23a, and in T'u Chi's *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* (1934) 49, 1a-3a. Cf. Also Rašid-ad-din, 179 and 274; Chao Hung, *Meng-Ta pei-lu* (Hai-ning Wang Ching-an hsien-sheng i-shu ed.), 9a and 11a; P'eng Ta-ya and Hsü T'ing, *Hei-Ta shih-lieh* (*ibid.*), 23a; *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu* (*ibid.*), 73b; Li Chih-ch'ang, *Hsi-yü chi* (*ibid.*), A, 10a *et passim*; A. Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (London, 1931), 166; P. Pelliot, *TP* 27 (1930), 46-9; F. W. Cleaves, *HJAS* 18 (1955), 401-2. The *Yüan-shih* 1, 16a, says that A-hai submitted to Cinggis in 1211 but this is a mistake, as already noted by Ch'ien Ta-hsin, *Nien-erb shih k'ao-i* (Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Peking, 1958), 1411. On the name A-hai see also W. H. Henthorn, *Korea. The Mongol Invasion* (Leiden, 1963), 186 n. 14.

2) Cf. for instance the case of Caγan (orig. name: I-te), a Tangut youth captured and adopted by Cinggis, who later became one of the leading captains in the war against Chin. On him see *Yüan-shih* 120, 1a-3a.

sides. In 1208 four high Chinese officials in the Chin government and their families had joined Cinggis Qan and “offered him counsel”. One of them, Li Tsao, was a scholar of the National University. They all urged him to attack Chin.¹⁾ At the same time, or shortly after, a number of Khitan troops in the Jurchen army also defected to Cinggis.²⁾ Yeh-lü Nieh-erh, another Khitan leader who must have rallied to Cinggis about 1210, actually submitted to him a ten-point plan of attack for which he was highly commended.³⁾ The Chinese officials’ defection had been caused by Chang-tsung’s suspiciousness and distrust.⁴⁾ In the case of the Khitans, defection was prompted by the desire to overthrow their masters and regain independence. A powerful stimulus in this direction was no doubt the presence of some of their hereditary leaders, such as the two Yeh-lü brothers, in Cinggis’ camp.

Thus, by 1210 Cinggis had a good, albeit theoretical, knowledge of the enemy—his military potential, his country, and his resources. The Chin “renegades” must have given him a comprehensive picture of the internal organization of the Chin state, its defence system, and other vital information. This is clearly implied in the “counsel” and “plan” that they had offered him.

Although Cinggis Qan’s government was truly a “government of the tent”, there existed even at this early stage a sort of rudimentary administration independent of the purely military functions of the court. As Wittfogel points out: “When a society is compounded of strongly conflicting elements, political domination is largely tied to

1) The other three officials were Pai Lun, Wu Feng-ch’en and T’ien Kuang-ming. See Yü-wen Mao-chao, *Ta-Chin kuo chih* (Wan-yu wen-ku ed.) 21, 152-3; Wu Kuang-ch’eng, *Hsi-Hsia shu-shih* (ph. rep. of 1825 ed., Peiping, 1935) 40, 1a. Cf. also the *T’ung-chien hsü-pien* by Ch’en Ching (Yüan ed. of ca. 1362 of the Peiping National Library) 19, 29b, where it is stated that in the sixth month (15 July-12 August) of 1208 “men of Chin came to submit”. This probably refers to the above personages. Li Tsao and Pai Lun became high ranking officials in the Mongol administration and were still holding office in 1221. See the *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 11a.

2) *Ta-Chin kuo chih* 21, 153.

3) *Yüan-shih* 149, 20a.

4) Three of the four officials in question had urged Chang-tsung to attack the Mongols. The emperor, however, thought that this was just a pretext to raise troops and gain advancement, and had them severely beaten.

military power. This is particularly apparent in societies of conquest. However, even under such circumstances the political machine is not identical with the army. A number of civil and military functions may overlap . . . yet the duties of the tax collector, the granary inspector, the judge, or the supervisor of the calendar and agriculture differ fundamentally from the coercive tasks of the armed forces. Whatever the relation between the army and the civil government . . . it is necessary to distinguish between the political organization which steers, supervises and administers, and the military machine which conquers, intimidates, and defends.”¹⁾

With the reorganization of the political and military structure in 1206, Cinggis had created a new important office dealing with the legal matters and the census, and had placed in charge of it the newly appointed judge (*jarγuci*) Šigi-Qutuqu, one of his most trusted followers and later a key figure in Sino-Mongol relations. Law pronouncements and data concerning the distribution of people among the nobility, by express order of Cinggis, were to be recorded in a special “Blue Book” (*kökō debter*).²⁾ According to the traditional account (*Yüan-shih*

1) Wittfogel and Feng, 428.

2) *Secret History* § 203. On Šigi-Qutuqu, besides the many references in the *Secret History* (see E. Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Manghol un Niuca Tobca'an* [Leipzig, 1939], 182 s.v. “Šigi ħuduĥu”, “Šigi ħutuĥu”, “Šigikan ħutuĥu”, “Šikikan ħuduĥu”, and 177 s.v. “Ĥutuĥu”) and in the *Yüan-shih* (see Tamura Jitsuzō, *Genshi goi shūsei* [Kyoto, 1961-3], 1138-9), cf. *Sbeng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*, 68b, 85a; Li Tao-ch'ien, *Kan-shui hsien-yüan lu* (Tao-tsang ed.) 3, 14b; Rašid-ad-din, *op. cit.*, I, 1, trans. by L. A. Khetagurov (Moscow, 1952), and I, 2 *passim*; Juvaini, 135, 166, 406; L. Hambis, *Le chapitre cviii du Yuan che* (Leiden, 1954), 173; F. W. Cleaves, *HJAS* 19 (1956), 241 and n. 438. The only biographies of Šigi-Qutuqu known to me are those in Tseng Lien, *Yüan-shu* (1910) 37, 1a-b, and K'o Shao-wen, *Hsin Yüan-shih* (1922) 126, 1a-3a, the latter being by far the best. Contrary to what is stated in *The Combined Indices to Thirty Collections of Liao, Chin and Yüan Biographies*, H.-Y. Inst. Sin. Ind. Ser. 35 (2nd ed., Tokyo, 1960), 69c, there are no biographies in the *Yüan-shih* and *Yüan-shih hsien-pien*. T'u Chi unfortunately never completed his biography of Šigi-Qutuqu which was to form *chüan* 29 of his *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi*. An article on Šigi-Qutuqu by Yao Ts'ung-wu appeared in *CYYY* 28 (1957), II, 567-82. A critical study of this personage by P. Ratchnevsky can be found in *CAJ* 10 (1965), 87-120. On the Blue Book or Blue Books see Pelliot in *TP* 27 (1930), 38-42 and 195-8, and Liu Ming-shu's article in the *Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu hui-k'an* 7 (1947), 101-6. Cf. also P. Ratchnevsky, “Über den mongolischen Einfluss auf die Gesetzgebung der Yüan-

124, 6a-b), writing had been introduced a few years earlier (ca. 1204) by the learned Uighur T'a-t'a T'ung-a (Tatar Tonya?), the ex-seal-keeper of Tayang of the Naimans. Cinggis had appointed T'a-t'a T'ung-a as his personal assistant (*tso-yu*) and had entrusted him with the duty of affixing the seal to all imperial edicts.¹⁾ If this text is reliable, we have indirect evidence that shortly after 1204 Cinggis' orders were committed to writing. This is, as we have seen, supported by the passage in the *Secret History* related to Šigi-Qutuqu and his duties. It is, however, doubtful whether Šigi-Qutuqu did the actual writing himself, this was probably done by the secretaries.²⁾ These secretaries (*bicēci*)³⁾ were mostly members of the culturally more advanced people: Uighurs like T'a-t'a T'ung-a, Kereits,⁴⁾ and, of course, Khitans and Jurchens,

Zeit", *Trans. of the 25th Int. Congress of Orientalists* (Moscow, 1960), V, 11. On the title *jar-yuci* (Ch. *tuan-shih-kuan*) "judge", see Akisada (Tamura) Jitsuzō's article in *Kawabara bakase kanreki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō* (Kyoto, 1930), 994-1024, and P. Ratchnevsky, *Code*, 52 n. 1.

1) Cf. P. Pelliot, *AM* 2 (1925), 287 and *TP* 27 (1930), 34 n. 1.

2) As already suggested by Pelliot, *TP* 27 (1930), 40.

3) In Chinese transcription *pi-she-ch'ih*, i.e. *bicēci* (*Genshi goi shūsei*, 616; *Cho-keung lu* 13, 201). This was the thirteenth-fourteenth century pronunciation of Written Mongolian *bicigeci* (**bicēci* = **bicēci* < **bici'eci* < *bicigeci*). The Middle Turkic word from which the Mongolian one derives appears in the forms *bitigüci*, *bitkäci* (A. von Gabain, *Altürkische Grammatik* [Leipzig, 1950], 303-4), and **bitigücin*, **bitigcin* in T'o-pa (L. Bazin, *TP* 39 [1950], 300-1, 303). According to Bazin **bitigcin* was probably a "secrétaire-archiviste de l'empereur", while **bitigücin* apparently designated a simple scribe. Cf. also Shiratori Kyrakichi in *Tōyō-gakuhō*, 1929, 173 No. 9). On the corresponding Persian title see E. Quatremère, *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse écrite en persan par Raschid-eldin* (Paris, 1836), 113-5 n. 53. Cf., however, Cleaves in *HJAS* 16 (1953), 61 n. 1. On the Mongolian title see also *TP* 5 (1905), 431; *JA*, 1930, 257; *YCHP* 30 (1946), 285-6; *CAJ* 8 (1963), 211; Ratchnevsky, *Code*, 54 n. 1.

4) The Kereits were more civilized because they had been under Uighur influence, and their leaders and most of their people had been converted to Nestorianism. Cf. Pelliot, *TP* 15 (1914), 627 ff. The most famous Kereit official in Cinggis' entourage was Cinqai (1169-1252), who was later put in charge of official documents in Uighur writing and affairs relating to the Moslem countries. During Ögödei's reign he shared in the direction of the secretariat with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and Nien-ho Chung-shan (on whom see *below*), and became chancellor of the empire under Güyüg. His life deserves a special study. Provisionally see his biographies in *Yüan-shih* 120, 10a-11a; *Hsin Yüan-shih* 133, 1a-3a; and *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 48, 10b-12a. See also *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 2a, 8b, 9a. There are many references to him in Rašid-ad-din, Juvaini and the *Hsi-yu chi*. Cf. Waley, 33-8, for a short biographical account, and *ibid.*, 162. Cf. also Barthold, 389-90; *TP* 15 (1914), 628-9; 28 (1929), 417-9; *JA* 211 (1927), 265 n. 1;

who were acquainted with Chinese language and culture. They combined purely scribal and secretarial duties with more responsible advisory functions, and in this capacity formed an integral part of the emperor's brain-trust. Hence, according to his own ability, a *bicēci* could be a scribe, an archivist, a calendar and divination expert, an administrative and fiscal consultant, and a minister.¹⁾ One of the earliest known *bicēci* was the Kereit Sira-Oγul, who was appointed by Cinggis in 1206 or even earlier.²⁾ The abovementioned Yeh-lü Nieh-erh was nominated *sayin bicēci* "good (=able) secretary" at the beginning of the hostilities with Chin.³⁾ A few years later, the Jurchen Nien-ho Chung-shan was also appointed *bicēci*.⁴⁾ Since the *bicēci* were officials in the immediate entourage of the emperor, they were automatically members of the Guard.⁵⁾ Obviously at this stage there could be no clear cut separation of civil and military duties. Nevertheless, even if a *bicēci* could, when military needs demanded, turn into an active army leader,⁶⁾ there is no

HJAS 14 (1951), 484-5, 495 ff.; 18 (1955), 397-8, 407-9; and my "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai", 207-8. Although most of Cinqai's functions pertained to the office of *bicēci*, and he is referred to as such in the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 2a, we know that his chief official designation was *cerbi* "chamberlain" (*Hsi-yu chi*, B, 5a). On this title see the *Secret History* §§ 124 and 234; Pelliot et Hambis, 348, 352-3.

1) Cf. *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 2a: "The Mongols have no term for minister, and only call him *bicēci*, which in Chinese means 'scribe' (*ling-shih*). This is because he is put in charge of official documents."

2) *Yüan-shih* 134, 25a. Cf., however, *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 50, 4b-5a.

3) *Yüan-shih* 149, 20a. But this is probably only an honorific designation that he received from Cinggis for the plan he had submitted. *Bicēci*, like the Chinese *shih-tzu*, had also the meaning of "learned or accomplished man". Cf. the expression *nara[n] bicēci* in the *Chih-yüan i-yü* (*Shih-lin kuang-chi*, Jap. ed. of 1684-5), 53b, rendered in Chinese as *hsiu-ts'ai* "accomplished scholar".

4) *Yüan-shih* 146, 12b. On Nien-ho Chung-shan see *below*, pp. 137-8, n. 2.

5) The *Secret History* does not mention the office of *bicēci* among those pertaining to the Guard (*kešüg*) as it had been re-organized in 1206. That this office was in the Guard is confirmed, however, by the biography of Nien-ho Chung-shan, where it is stated that Cinggis "made him *bicēci* in the Imperial Guard" (*Yüan-shih*, *loc. cit.*). *Bicēci* figure also among the officers in the Guard listed in the *Yüan-shih* 99, 2b, where it is stated that they were "those who took charge of records for the emperor". See Chavannes in *TP* 5 (1904), 431 n.; Ratchnevsky, *Code*, 54 n. 1.

6) As, for instance, did Nien-ho Chung-shan. See *Yüan-shih* 146, 13a. Yeh lü Ch'u-ts'ai, on the other hand, was never entrusted with military duties. During the Liao, the chief scribe "might also lead an army to victory, suppress a rebellion, or

doubt, I think, that his basic functions were more of a bureaucratic nature like those of the *jarγuci*. These officials may, therefore, be regarded as “semi-civil” officials within an essentially military administration.

When Cinggis Qan began the invasion of Chin in early 1211, he was assisted by several “foreign” advisers who were well acquainted with local conditions and formed together a rudimentary secretariat-chancellery, capable of performing essential administrative tasks.¹) Since

initiate a revolution”. And “a right and left scribe assisted the regular commander in chief in directing the army on the march.” (Wittfogel and Feng, 442.)

1) It should be mentioned that among the foreigners in Cinggis’ service there were also some Inner Asian Moslems. One of them was Ja’far Ḥōja, whose biography is found in *Yüan-shih* 120, 6a-8a. Another was Ḥasan, a merchant, who is mentioned in the *Secret History* § 182 (as “Asan”), and in Rašid-ad-din, *I*, 2, 199, 200. They joined Cinggis quite early, since they both participated in the Baljuna covenant. See Cleaves, *HJAS* 18 (1955), 396-7, 403. Barthold has already drawn attention to them as “the first representatives of civilization at the court of Chingiz-Khan (even before 1203) of whom any account has come down to us.” (*Turkestan*, 386-7.) It is possible, however, that chronologically the two Yeh-lü brothers have priority over the Moslems. Like the Yeh-lü’s, Ja’far Ḥōja and Ḥasan acted as Cinggis’ advisers, personal envoys, etc. On Ja’far see Pelliot, “Sur un passage du *Cheng-wou ts’in-tcheng lou*”, *Ts’ai Yuan Pei Anniversary Volume* (Peking, 1935), 925-6; *ibid.*, *Le Ḥōja et le Sayyid Ḥusain de l’Histoire des Ming*, (Leiden, 1948), 109; *ibid.*, *Notes on Marco Polo*, s.v. “Coja”; *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 11b (where “*Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*” is a mistake for “*Meng-Ta pei-lu*”), and B, 14a-b; Waley, 5, 135, 137 (cf. Pelliot’s c.r. in *TP* 28 [1931], 427; *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 10b. T’u Chi (*Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 46, 1a) and K’o Shao-wen (*Hsin Yüan-shih* 131, 1a) have erroneously identified Ja’far Ḥōja with A-la-ch’ien or A-li-hsien, a Tangut in Cinggis’ entourage who also served as envoy on various missions. He is mentioned in the *Secret History* § 280 (as “A-la-ch’ien”) and in the *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 11a *et passim* (as “A-li-hsien”). Cf. Waley, 161; Chavannes, *TP* 5 (1904), 368, 372; Ts’ai Mei-piao, *Yüan-tai pai-hua-pei chi-lu* (Peking, 1955), 2. T’u Chi (*loc. cit.*), has further identified A-la-ch’ien with the abovementioned Ḥasan. Wang Kuo-wei (*Hsi-yu chi*, A, 11a-b; B, 14b) has already shown that T’u’s and K’o’s identification of Ja’far with A-la-ch’ien is wrong, and so is, of course, that with Ḥasan. The error unfortunately has passed into the *Combined Indices*, 152c s.v. “Cha-pa-erh Huo-chih”. However, Wang (*Hsi-yu chi*, A, 11a) has in turn identified A-la-ch’ien with the I-li-chih of *Chin-shih* 14, 1b ff. and this identification has been adopted by Waley, 39 (where “I li-chi” is a *lapsus* for “I-li-chih”). In his review of Waley, Pelliot has remarked that “l’identité du Yi-li-tche du *Kin che*, du A-la-ts’ien de l’*Histoire secrète des Mongols* . . . et du A-li-sien du *Si-yeou ki* n’est pas autrement évidente. On peut même se demander si le Yi-li-tche du *Kin che* n’est pas le mongol *älji* (*älji*, *äljin*, *elji*), ‘envoyé’, pris par erreur pour un nom d’homme.” (*TP* 28 [1931], 419.) Pelliot is certainly right; however, I-li-chih may also transcribe *Elji[dei] (=Eljidei < Eljigidei), a name borne

these advisers and secretaries were educated men who enjoyed the emperor's confidence, they could, and did in fact, play an important role as cultural intermediaries between the Mongol ruling élite and the civilized world of the time. Their influence is apparent in the use the Mongols made of local personnel during the Chin campaign, and in their selective adoption of Chinese administrative practices. The process of adaptation to local conditions reached its climax with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's fiscal measures of 1229-1230, the establishment of the *chung-shu-sheng* in 1231, and the social and economic reforms of the following years. The years 1211-1229 are therefore of great interest and deserve a closer investigation. This period can be divided into two distinct phases:

First Phase 1211-1215 From the beginning of the invasion to the fall of Chung-tu

Second Phase 1216-1229 From the return of Cinggis Qan to Mongolia to the election of Ögödei and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's early reforms.

The First Phase, 1211-1215

The Mongols began their attack in the middle of 1211. They made inroads on the border region (modern Chahar, Suiyüan, Northern Hopei and Shansi) destroying Chin fortifications along the Great Wall. In the following year they continued to weaken the Jurchen line of defence. The operations were confined mainly to Northern Shansi, Chahar and Liaoning. In the latter part of 1213 there was a progressive penetration of the northern districts followed by a massive three-pronged attack which brought the Mongol armies deep into Shansi, Hopei and Shantung, and as far south as Meng-chou in Northern

by several contemporary personages. Cf., for instance, the form Yeh-li-chih (*Elji-[dei]) of *Yüan-shih* 20, 20a (the text has Yeh-chih-li which is certainly a mistake for Yeh-li-chih) and 107, 4a. See L. Hambis, *Le chapitre cvii du Yuan che* (Leiden, 1945), 29 n.1. These two Moslems were among the first of a number of Central and Western Asian Moslems later to be employed, mainly as financial advisers, by the Mongol court.

Honan. The three armies, led respectively by Cinggis (Centre), his brother Joci-Qasar (Left) and his sons Joci, Cayatai and Ögödei (Right), plundered the country, then converged on Chung-tu in the beginning of 1214. Owing to the difficulty of seizing the Chin capital, the Mongols concluded peace in March-April and withdrew their armies. While on his way to the north, Cinggis learned that Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-23) had transferred the capital to Pien (K'ai-feng). Prompted by his advisers, he made this move a pretext to resume the hostilities, quickly retraced his steps, laid siege to Chung-tu and gave orders to carry on the operations in Hopei, Jehol and Liaoning. Peking fell in May 1215.¹)

During these first four years of the conquest the Mongols had to grapple with new and difficult problems; foremost among these was the capture of fortified towns. The Mongols had hardly had any previous experience in siege techniques, nor had they at this stage the right weapons, such as catapults. Moreover, as soon as the Mongol horsemen appeared the Chinese peasants "fled and dispersed" to forests, mountains, marshes and caves, and all the Mongols could do was to lay waste the countryside. In handling this problem, i.e. the capture of fortresses and the organization of the local population, they were greatly helped by the advisers already in their service, and by the increasing number of Chinese, Khitan and, to a lesser extent, Jurchen officials who defected to their side. The most important defectors of this period were the

1) On these events see *Yüan-shih* 1, 16a-19a; *Hsin Yüan-shih* 3, 3b-8b; *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 3, 9b-17a. Cf. O. Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches, IV* (Berlin, 1948), 267 ff.; R. Grousset, *L'empire Mongol*, 215 ff.; P. Pelliot, "Sur un passage", 907 ff. H. Desmond Martin's detailed account in *The Rise of Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China* (Baltimore, 1950), ch. V and VI, must be used with caution. Chung-tu surrendered on 31 May 1215 (*Chin-shih* 14, 10a; 101, 5a), after a ten- or eleven-month siege. According to *Yüan-shih* 1, 18a, the siege began in the sixth month of 1214 (9 July-7 August), but the *T'ung-chien hsü-pien* 20, 7b, followed by the *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 3, 14b, gives the seventh month (8 August-5 September), and the *Ta-Chin kuo chih* 24, 17b, the eighth month (6 September-4 October). The chronology of these events in the latter work is, however, quite unreliable. On the fall of Chung-tu see also Li Yu-t'ang, *Chin-shih chi-shih pen-mo* (1903), 39; Barthold, 394. An excellent description of the Mongol campaign against Chin is Sun K'o-k'uan's *Meng-ku ch'u-ch'i chih chün-lüeh yü Chin chih peng-k'uei* (Taipei, 1955).

following (in chronological order and with their place of origin when known):¹⁾

1211	Liu Po-lin	1148-1221	Chinese	Chi-ning (Chahar)
	Ni	1200-1262	Chinese	Chi-ning (Chahar)
	Kuo Pao-yü	? -1224+	Chinese	Cheng-hsien (Shensi)
	Te-hai	? -1233/4	Chinese	Cheng-hsien (Shensi)
	Chang Jung	1158-1230	Chinese	Ch'ing-chou (Hopei)
	Shih-mo Ming-an	1164-1216	Khitan	Huan-chou (Chahar)
	Hsien-te-pu	? -1235+	Khitan	Huan-chou (Chahar)
	*I-la Nieh-erh	? -1228	Khitan	Pa-chou (Hopei)
	Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko	? -1216	Jurchen	Chahar?
1212	Liu Min	1201-1259	Chinese	Ch'ing-lu (Chahar)
	Yeh-lü Liu-ko	1165-1220	Khitan	?
	Hsüeh-she	1193-1238	Khitan	?
	*Chia-ku T'ung-chu	fl. 1212-1223	Jurchen	Hsia-shui chen (Shansi)
1213	Chao Chin	1201-1280	Chinese	Wei-chou (Chahar)
	*Wang Chi	? -1240	Chinese	Kuo-hsien (Shensi)
	Shih Ping-chih	1158-1230	Chinese	Yung-ch'ing (Hopei)
	T'ien-ni	1185-1225	Chinese	Yung-ch'ing (Hopei)
	T'ien-hsiang	1191-1258	Chinese	Yung-ch'ing (Hopei)
	T'ien-tse	1202-1275	Chinese	Yung-ch'ing (Hopei)
	Chao Jou	fl. 1213-1236	Chinese	Lai-shui (Hopei)
	*Wang Yü	1191-1260	Chinese	Ning-chin (Hopei)
	*Hao Ho-shang	? -1252	Chinese	T'ai-yüan (Shansi)
	Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh	1164-1233	Khitan	Pa-chou (Hopei)
	*Ao-t'un Shih-ying	1180-1241	Jurchen	P'u-ch'eng (Shensi)
1214	Ti Shun	1183-1256	Chinese	Hsing-t'ang (Hopei)
	Li Shou-hsien	1189-1234	Chinese	I-chou (Liaoning)
	Hsiao Cha-la-erh	fl. 1214-1232	Khitan	?
	*Nien-ho Chung-shan	? -1238	Jurchen	?
1215	Tung Chün	1186-1223	Chinese	Kao-ch'eng (Hopei)
	Chao Ti	1183-1252	Chinese	Kao-ch'eng (Hopei)
	Shih T'ien-ying	? -1223	Chinese	Yung-te (Liaoning)
	T'ien Hsiung	ca. 1189-1246	Chinese	Pei-ching (Jehol)
	Wang I	fl. 1214-1220	Chinese	Ning-chin (Hopei)
	Wang Hsün	1177-1224	Khitan	K'ai-i (Liaoning)
	Shih-mo Yeh-hsien	1177-1217	Khitan	Pei-ching (Jehol)

*) The year of defection of these personages is not absolutely certain. There might be a discrepancy of one or two years.

1) In this list I have included defectors' sons who distinguished themselves on the Mongol side already in Cinggis Qan's time. Data concerning the life and career of all these personages come mainly from their official biographies in the *Yüan-shih*, *Hsin Yüan-shih* and *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi*, from contemporary accounts and from funerary inscriptions in their honour. Exact references are given at the end of this article.

These “defectors” were people of varied extraction and social condition. They included garrison commanders, army officers and local government officials (forming altogether the largest group),¹⁾ Chin envoys to the Mongols,²⁾ members of prominent local families,³⁾ and locally elected chiefs⁴⁾ (see *below*). They included also hostages and prisoners who should be properly classified as collaborators rather than defectors.⁵⁾ The “chiefs” (*chang*), a typical product of troubled times, were locally elected leaders of militia corps whose main duties were the organization of supplies, repression of bandits and general defence in areas where government control was weak or non-existent. If their leadership proved effective, the number of families under their protection increased with the adherence of people from neighbouring villages and towns. Therefore, these chiefs were often in charge of whole *hsien* and assumed titles like *tu-t'ung* or general controller.⁶⁾

All these men were in fact responsible for many lives besides their own and those of their family members. Hence the main motivation for their voluntary surrender to the enemy was the sparing of large groups of people in situations where opposition to the Mongols would have meant certain death. An important factor, nevertheless, was the weakness of the loyalty binding Chinese and Khitans to the Jurchens. This is clearly shown by the large number of defections among these two groups when compared with the almost insignificant number of defections of Jurchen nationals. Chinese sources discriminate, however, between several kinds of motivation; therefore, we may divide the defectors in Cinggis Qan's time into four categories: 1. those who

1) Liu Po-lin, Kuo Pao-yü, Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko, Yeh-lü Liu-ko, Wang Chi, Wang Yü, Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh, Ao-t'un Shih-ying, Tung Chün, Chao Ti, T'ien Hsiung.

2) Shih-mo Ming-an, Chao Jung (?).

3) Shih Ping-chih.

4) Chao Jou, Ti Shun, Shih T'ien-ying, Wang I, Wang Hsün.

5) The Jurchen noble Nien-ho Chung-shan was probably among the Chin hostages given to Cinggis in 1214. See *Yüan-shih* 146, 12b. Among the captives were Liu Min and Hao Ho-shang. The background of Chia-ku T'ung-chu and Li Shou-hsien is unknown. Shih-mo Yeh-hsien was a member of a Khitan family that had refused to serve the Chin.

6) See the biography of Wang I, *Yüan-shih* 151, 3a-5a.

realized the approaching end of Chin and the rise of a new dynasty ¹⁾ (clearly a later rationalisation); 2. those who took the opportunity of the invasion to rebel against their traditional enemy (it applies chiefly to the Khitan hereditary leaders and the Khitan forces incorporated into the Chin army) ²⁾; 3. those who defected to spare the lives of their dependants and followers ³⁾; 4. those who defected to join their relatives fallen into the hands of the Mongols.⁴⁾

Upon surrender the defectors were either re-instated in their former post or assigned new tasks. In the majority of cases they were put in charge of their native district, which was often the locality (*hsien* or *chou*) where they were holding office at the time of the surrender.⁵⁾ The reason for re-instatement was that these officials enjoyed the esteem of the local population and on the strength of their authority could carry out the Mongols' orders of requisition of men and goods more effectively. Their presence would also reduce the danger of a local rebellion. The Mongols used these newly acquired allies in various ways during the long war against Chin. Some of them were employed as experts on local problems or as guides attached to the vanguard like the earlier defectors.⁶⁾ Others were used as intermediaries in obtaining the surrender of the Chin strongholds.

1) Yeh-lü A-hai, Nien-ho Chung-shan.

2) I-la Nieh-erh, Yeh-lü Liu-ko, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien. On Cinggis' early search for Khitan defectors see *Yüan-shih* 149, 12a (s.a. 1214).

3) Shih Ping-chih, Chao Chin.

4) Chang Jou, a defector of 1218. See *The Second Phase*.

5) In the case of the defectors of the years 1211-5, Liu Po-lin was re-instated in his former rank; Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko was placed in charge of Wei-ning of which he had previously been in command; Yeh-lü Liu-ko was confirmed as the Khitan leader in Liaoning; Chia-ku T'ung-chu, Chao Jou, Wang Yü, Hao Ho-shang, Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh, Ti Shun, Li Shou-hsien, Tung Chün, Shih T'ien-ying, Wang I, Wang Hsün and Shih-mo Yeh-hsien were all appointed or re-appointed in their native districts. Later Yeh-lü A-hai and T'u-hua established their military headquarters in Te-hsing and Hsüan-te (Chahar), i.e. also in their native district.

6) Yeh-lü A-hai and T'u-hua had been attached to the main Mongol forces as guides (*hsiang-tao*) at the beginning of the campaign; Shih-mo Ming-an also served as guide. I-la Nieh-erh's submission of a ten-point plan of conquest has already been mentioned. Further advice on Chinese conditions was given to Cinggis by Kuo Pao-yü and, later, by his son Te-hai. Cf. the role of the Korean defectors during the Mongol campaign against Korea under Ögödei in Henthorn, 61 ff.

Owing to the already-mentioned difficulty of capturing walled towns, and also because they had much smaller forces in the field, the Mongols tried, whenever possible, to win over the enemy by means of threats and offers of reward. The work of persuasion could better be done by Chinese, Khitan and Jurchen emissaries than by the Mongol generals themselves, unacquainted as they were with the language and customs of the country. Yeh-lü T'u-hua, Liu Po-lin, Wang Chi, Shih Ping-chih, Chao Jou, Ao-t'un Shih-ying, Ti Shun, and many others after 1215¹⁾ obtained the surrender of hundreds of thousands of households through negotiations with Chin commanders. Later on Chinese would also be sent by the Mongols as envoys to the Sung court.²⁾ However, this diplomatic activity was by no means separate from the military duties of the defectors. It was part of them. As representatives of the Mongol authority in a certain area, or as commanding officers in the field, the defectors remained, above all, military leaders.

After being put in charge of the people they had led to surrender by the Mongol generals, one of their first duties was in fact to select and enlist men to fight for the Mongols.³⁾ These locally recruited troops, together with the Khitan rebels and the Chinese militia corps that had defected with their leaders, formed a considerable auxiliary army. Variousy known as the Black Army (*Hei-chün*) or the Han Army (*Han-chün*), the auxiliaries were in action as early as 1213.⁴⁾ They were

1) In particular, Liang Ying, Wang Shan and T'ien Hsiung. See *The Second Phase*.

2) Hao Ho-shang was sent as ambassador to Sung on several occasions, and so was Wang Chi, who actually died in the course of one of these missions.

3) As a rule, the Chin officials who surrendered to the Mongols were placed in command of their own followers and dependants. See, e.g., the biography of Wang Yü (*Yüan-shih* 151, 5b). Cf. Henthorn, 84 n. 10. On the selection of men from the surrendered people see the biography of Shih T'ien-hsiang, *Yüan-shih* 147, 16b).

4) The Black Army probably obtained its name from the colour of the soldiers' coats, as already suggested by Sun K'o-k'uan, *Meng-ku Han-chün yü Han wen-hua yen-chiu* (Taipei, 1958), 2. It was first placed by Muqali under the command of Shih Huai-te, the younger brother of Shih Ping-chih, in 1213. Huai-te died shortly after and the command passed to his son T'ien-hsiang. Another Han army was apparently led by Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh in 1214. Subsequently, Shih T'ien-ying called his army *Hei-chün* on account of the black flags that his troops used. From these and other

assigned to guard important prefectures and strategic areas, but could be directed to any locality according to the need, and participate in the military operations jointly with the Mongol army. Before 1215, the Khitan and Chinese officers in charge of the Han Army were under the supreme command of Samuqa-ba'atur and Yeh-lü T'u-hua.¹⁾ Although the Khitan probably formed the core of these local and auxiliary forces,²⁾ the rank and file were mainly Chinese. An interesting feature of their internal organization is that it followed the Chin system. At this time the Chin defence military organization combined both traditional Chinese and Jurchen tribal elements. The regional defence system was patterned on the Sung model with prefectures classified for military purposes into *chieh-chen* (regional garrison command), *fang-yü* (regional defence command) and *t'z'u-shih* (prefect). The main military agencies were the *tsung-kuan-fu* (general military administration), the *t'ung-chün-ssu* (army control bureau) and the *chao-t'ao-ssu* (punitive bureau).³⁾ However, Khitan and Jurchen features were

references it appears that these armies were not integrated till the beginning of Ögödei's reign. See *Yüan-shih* 98, 1a-3a; *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 54, 6b n.; and Sun's important contribution, *op. cit.*, 1-43. The Han auxiliaries must be distinguished from the Mongol auxiliary corps known as the *tamaci* troops. These at first consisted only of members of fourteen tribes which had helped Cinggis in fighting his rivals in Mongolia. Later, when the leaders of these tribes were given apanages in North China, Chinese, Khitan and Jurchen troops were also incorporated into their private armies. See Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 63 n. 46; *ibid.*, "Problems of Political Organization During the Yüan Dynasty", *Trans. of the 25th Int. Congr. of Or.*, V, 27 where, however, the statement based on *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 41, 59b, that the Han army "consisted mostly of North Chinese recruited after the fall of Chin" is incorrect. On the *Han-chün* cf. also Henthorn, 192 n. 54.

1) On Samuqa-ba'atur see Pelliot, "Sur un passage", 921 and 935 n. 37.

2) There was a large-scale desertion of Khitan troops from 1212 onward. During this year, Yeh-lü Liu-ko and his Khitan and Chinese troops rebelled in Liaoning and formally submitted to the Mongols. In 1214 Hsüan-tsung's Khitan guard rebelled shortly after the emperor's departure from Chung-tu. The following year the Khitan garrison of Pei-ching mutinied and went over to the Mongols. On Yeh-lü Liu-ko's rebellion see Yanai Watari, *Mōkoshi kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1930), 33-41, Henthorn, 5-6; on the Khitan rebellions against Chin see *Seichō no kenkyō tōchi seisaku*, ed. by the Tōa Kenkyūjo (Tokyo, 1944), 361-94. Cf. also *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 14a.

3) See *Chin-shih* 57, 10a ff.; *Ta-Chin kuo chih* 38, 286 ff. See also Yanai's study on the Chin military system in *Mōkoshi kenkyū*, 127-210. On the Sung system see E. A. Kracke, Jr., *Civil Service in Early Sung China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 48.

preserved in the special army known as the *chiu-chün*, and in such military units as the *meng-an* (a unit of a thousand men) and the *mou-k'o* (a unit of a hundred men).¹⁾ The latter designations had their origin in the Jurchen tribal order, and their counterpart was found also in the Mongol society and military organization.²⁾

Now, if we turn to the biographies of the ex-Chin officials in the Mongols' service we will notice that, with some exceptions which we shall discuss later, all the office titles that were conferred by their new masters fall into two categories: 1. Chinese military offices and honorary titles used by the Chin³⁾; 2. Mongolian military offices.⁴⁾ Although

1) On the *chiu-chün* see Yanai's important discussion in *Mōkoshi kenkyū*, 69-125. Cf. also Pelliot in *TP* 26 (1929), 128-9, and Wittfogel and Feng, 137 n. *Meng-an* and *mou-k'o* were both designations of units and of the officers in command of these units. See *Chin-shih* 44, 2a; 57, 21a-b; 135, 9b; Yanai, 157 ff.

2) Cf. the Mongol *ja'un-u noyan* "leader of a hundred, centurion", and *miryan-u noyan* "leader of a thousand, chiliarch". *Miryan* was used to designate the unit as well as the officer's rank. See the *Secret History* §§ 213, 269. On the organization on decimal basis of the Mongol tribes and troops see Vladimirtsov, 133 ff. (the "*jä'ün ~ jägün*" on page 134 is a mistake for "*ja'un ~ jagun*"). See also Honda Minobu's articles in *Shigaku-zasshi* 62 (1953), 701-26, and *Rekishi-kyōiku* 9, 7 (1961), 10-18. The contemporary Koryō military system was also on a decimal basis. See Henthorn, 83 n. 9.

3) The following are samples of offices and titles conferred before 1215: *ping-ma fu-yüan-shuai* (Liu Po-lin), *yüan-shuai tso-tu-chien* (Chang Jung), *chao-t'ao-shih* (Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko), *tu-yüan-shuai* (Shih Ping-chih), *ma-pu-chün tu-t'ung* (Shih T'ien-ni), *yüan-shuai tso-chien-chün* (Wang Yü), *chieh-tu-shih* (Li Shou-hsien), *huai-yüan ta-chiang-chün* (Chang Jung). Alongside the purely military ranks conferred on the defectors, we also find offices the military nature of which is not obvious. For instance, upon surrender Ti Shun was made *ling* (magistrate, sub-prefect) of his native *hsien*; Chao Jou, on Ja'far's recommendation, was appointed *chang-kuan* (senior official) of the two *chou* of Cho and I in Hopei. However, the careers of both these officials show that they were primarily concerned with military affairs. Their position as local leading officials may therefore be regarded as similar to that of a military governor.

4) Among the military ranks: *pai-hu=ja'un-u noyan* (Chao Chin); *ch'ien-hu=miryan-u noyan* (Liu Po-lin, Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko, Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh). According to some early Yüan sources, Liu Po-lin was made *wan-hu* (= *tümen-ü noyan* "leader of ten-thousand, myriarch"). See the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 23a, where he is called "the first myriarch among the northern Chinese", and the inscription for the *shen-tao-pei* of Ti Tse by Yao Sui (1239-1314) in *Mu-an chi* 21, 2a (cf. *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 63, 11a). This is indirectly stated also in the *Yüan-shih* 149, 5b, where it is said that Po-lin's son inherited his office of *wan-hu*. According to *Yüan-shih* 1, 17b, Shih T'ien-ni and Hsiao Po-tieh (i.e. Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh) were also appointed *wan-hu*. However, Ch'ien Ta-hsin long ago pointed out that no Chinese could have been given such

there is evidence that in some cases a particular Chinese official designation was to some extent self-conferred, there is no doubt that the majority of appointments and promotions proceeded directly or indirectly (by delegation) from the supreme Mongol authority.¹⁾ The general pattern shows that the people responsible for these appointments were well acquainted with the Chin bureaucratic system. However, an important new departure from the Chin emerged in the practice of granting Silver, Gold, and Golden Tiger tablets as emblems of authority, usually on appointment (or promotion) to a high post in the hierarchy.²⁾ These tablets, or *paizas* as they are commonly known,

an exclusive rank at this early stage. On the basis of a passage from the biography of Muqali by Chang K'uang-yen quoted in Su T'ien-chüeh's *Yüan-ch'ao ming-ch'ên shih-lüeh* (Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ed.) 1, 2, Ch'ien claims that the designation *wan-hu* in this period was not a proper official title, but a term indicating that the holder was in charge of ten thousand households of surrendered people (*Nien-erb shih k'ao-i* 86, 1412). According to T'u Chi (*Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 51, 1b), Liu Po-lin was only a *ch'ien-hu*. I think he is correct, since before his surrender Po-lin was the *ch'ien-hu* in charge of the garrison of Wei-ning (Hsing-ho hsien, Chahar). When he defected to the Mongols, Cinggis is reputed to have asked him what kind of official he was. Po-lin said he was a *tu-t'i-k'ung* or general intendant, whereupon Cinggis "gave him his original office" (*Yüan-shih* 149, 6a). It seems likely that he was then re-instated as *ch'ien-hu*. However, Po-lin's son, the famous Liu Ni, alias Hei-ma ("Black Horse"), was actually appointed *wan-hu* at the beginning of Ögödei's reign, and I think that a few years later this office was posthumously extended to his father. This may have been the case also with Shih T'ien-ni and his son Ch'üan (see *ibid.* 147, 9a and 13a). In view of the later popularity of the office of *wan-hu* in the Yüan dynasty, we cannot exclude on the other hand that a genuine confusion occurred between the two terms. This confusion is known to have taken place elsewhere. In Rašid-ad-din, for instance, chiliarchs are often called "*tümen*", i.e. myriarchs. See Vladimirtsov, 135 n. 5. On the Mongol chiliarchies, besides Honda's article in *Shigaku-zasshi* quoted above (p. 110, n. 2), see also Cleaves in *HJAS* 13 (1950), 55-6 n. 190.

1) On self-assumed titles see what P'eng Ta-ya and Hsü T'ing say in *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 14b-15a. However, their remarks are valid only for the period of Ögödei's rule. As for the early appointments, they were either made directly by Cinggis (Liu Po-lin, Chang Jung, Shih-mo Ming-an, Ti Shun, Li Shou-hsien, Chia-ku T'ung-chu, Nien-ho Chung-shan), or by his lieutenant Muqali (Kuo Pao-yü, Shih Ping-chih and his relatives, Shih-mo Po-tieh-erb, Shih T'ien-ying), or by Cinggis upon someone else's recommendation (Chao Jou — recommended by Ja'far). There are, however, instances of Chin officers who submitted to the army led by one of the Khitan defectors and had their rank restored by them. See *Yüan-shih* 150, 17a (Biography of Shih-mo Ming-an).

2) Liu Po-lin received the Golden Tiger Tablet upon his promotion to *ping-ma fu-yüan-shuai* and governor of Hsi-ching (Ta-t'ung hsien, Shansi); Chia-ku T'ung-chu

came into use in Cinggis Qan's time, and Haneda Tōru has positively identified their immediate origin as Khitan.¹⁾ In view of this, I am of the opinion that the Khitan personal advisers of Cinggis Qan played a major role in these early Chin- and Khitan-inspired bureaucratic practices.²⁾

The need to mobilize local troops, to obtain supplies, and to run an efficient communication system³⁾ also made inevitable the establishment of local military administrations in the areas that were progressively brought under Mongol control. These tasks were carried out at first by the generals in charge of local armies and by the leading officials of the *chou* and *hsien* in the areas under their jurisdiction, many of whom, as we have seen, were northern Chinese. In this way, the Chin admin-

when he was appointed *chao-t'ao-shih*; Shih T'ien-hsiang received the Golden Tablet when he was made *t'i-k'ung yüan-shuai*; Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh received the Silver Tablet when he was made *ch'ien-hu*; etc.

1) See *Haneda bakase shigaku ronbunshū* (Kyoto, 1958), pp. 9-16 of the French text. Cf. Shimada Masao in *Takigawa bakase kanreki kinen ronbunshū* (Ueda, 1957), 141-51. There is a vast literature in several languages on these tablets of authority (in Mongolian *gerege*). See Cleaves, *HJAS* 16 (1953), 255-9 (with essential bibliography on pp. 256-7); 13 (1950), 55 n. 188; Yanai, *Mōkoshi kenkyū*, 839-98; *Haneda bakase*, 8-10 and 92-114; P. Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13 und 14 Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1954), 34, 64 n. 145, and 87; N. Poppe and J. R. Krueger, *The Mongolian Monuments in ᠬᠢᠮᠠᠭᠤᠰᠤ Script* (Wiesbaden, 1957), 57 ff. Cf. also *TP* 5 (1904), 428 n. 4, Henthorn, 83 n. 9, L. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), 88 n. 103, and H. Serruys, *The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu Period (1368-1398)* (Bruxelles, 1959), 104 n. 132.

2) Haneda, in discussing the tablets of authority, had suggested Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243) as a possible intermediary of Khitan culture (*op. cit.*, pp. 15-16 of the French text). This is excluded, however, for the period we are concerned with, since Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai joined Cinggis Qan only in 1218. See my "*Hsi-yu lu*", 44 n. 36. I believe that Cinggis' two most influential advisers on Chinese affairs were Yeh-lü A-hai and T'u-hua. Of the two brothers, A-hai in particular seems to have been very close to the emperor from early days. In his biography it is stated that he was allowed to participate in planning and "was constantly used as adviser during the military campaigns" (*Yüan-shih* 150, 9a). It is most likely (also for reasons that will become apparent later on) that he was the defector chiefly responsible for the early limited adoption of Chinese bureaucratic and administrative practices.

3) This required the availability of a great number of horses. Thus, it is not surprising to find that some of the defectors were entrusted, among other duties, with the requisition of these animals. See the biographies of Kuo Pao-yü and his son (*Yüan-shih* 149, 11b and 12b).

istrative machinery, paralyzed and dislocated by the invading army, was gradually brought into operation again. An important development in this direction was the establishment of *hsing-sheng*, or regional administrations, to control larger territories and co-ordinate the military and administrative activity in the various districts.

In view of the importance of this agency in the early Yüan, I shall briefly outline its history during the Chin period. Early in the dynasty the Chin, following the Sui-T'ang model, had established a *hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng* or mobile regional administration in charge of civil and military affairs in the territories newly conquered from the Sung.¹⁾ This office was first set up by Hsi-tsung (r. 1135-49) in Pien-ching (K'ai-feng) in 1137; it was removed to Yen-ching in the following year, and again transferred to Pien-ching in 1140. It was abolished by Hai-ling Wang (r. 1149-61) at the beginning of 1151 in a series of sweeping administrative reforms.²⁾ It will be remembered that the supreme administrative body during the Chin dynasty was the *shang-shu-sheng* or presidential council. It had been established in 1126, following the Liao and, indirectly, the T'ang model, as one of the three councils (*san-sheng*), the other two being the *chung-shu-sheng* and the *men-hsia-sheng*. In 1156, Hai-ling Wang abolished the *chung-shu-sheng* and the *men-hsia-sheng*, and their functions were taken over by the *shang-shu-sheng*.³⁾ Increasing military activity in the latter part of the dynasty, and particularly after 1195, made it necessary once more to set up regional military commands to deal promptly with all contingencies. These agencies, now called *hsing-sheng* (short for *hsing-shang-shu-sheng*), represented the *shang-shu-sheng*, i.e. the central government, in a threatened area. The officials in charge of them, also called *hsing-sheng*, wielded supreme military and civil authority in the district or region placed under their command. During the war with the Mongols the number of *hsing-sheng* increased noticeably, and frequent references to

1) On the origin of the *hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng* and its functions see R. des Rotours, *Traité des Fonctionnaires et Traité de l'Armée* (Leyde, 1947-8), 708-9 n. 1.

2) See *Chin-shih* 4, 3a-4a; 5, 6a; 55, 4a. Cf. also *Ta-Chin kuo chih* 9, 82; 10, 83.

3) The organization of this office is described in *Chin-shih* 55, 2b-3b. Cf. Mikami Tsugio in *Tōkyō daigaku kyōyōgakubu kiyō* 28 (1963), 1-92, and *Rekishi to bunka* 7 (1964).

them are found in the *Chin-shih*.¹) In fact, from a review of the Annals and Biographies of the *Chin-shih*, it appears that during the last three decades of the dynasty the administration of the Chin districts (*lu*) was almost entirely in the hands of these regional commanders most of whom, of course, were Jurchen nationals.²)

Turning now to the side of the Mongols, we notice that several of their officers (Mongol, Khitan and Chinese) were also appointed *hsing-sheng* (= *hsing-shang-shu-sheng*). The first *hsing-shang-shu-sheng* was established in Hsüan-p'ing (north-east of Huai-an hsien, Chahar) in 1214, and the already mentioned Samuqa-ba'atur was put in charge of it. The function of this office, as described in our source,³) was "to control the people who had surrendered". This meant that Hsüan-p'ing, one of the strategically important towns in the north, became the centre of the military administration of the newly conquered areas in the border region. The appointment of Samuqa as *hsing-sheng* is also significant in view of his close association with Yeh-lü A-hai and T'u-hua.⁴) Here, again, the Khitan influence on the Mongol military may have been an important factor.⁵)

1) See *Kinshi goi shūsei* and *Genshi goi shūsei* s.v. *gyōshō* (*hsing-sheng*). Cf. also Pelliot et Hambis, 196.

2) However, Khitan and Chinese were also appointed as *hsing-sheng*. See *Chin-shih* 14, 12a; 15, 9b; 112, 9a; etc.

3) *T'ung-chien hsü-pien* 20, 7a.

4) The two Yeh-lü brothers, Shih-mo Ming-an, and Liu Po-lin, together with their mixed Khitan and Chinese troops had been attached to Samuqa's army when the Mongols resumed their hostilities in 1214. Samuqa and Yeh-lü A-hai were appointed leaders of the Han auxiliary forces. See *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 3, 14b. Cf. Martin, 174.

5) In Wu T'ing-hsieh's chronological table of *hsing-sheng* (*Yüan hsing-sheng ch'eng-hsiang p'ing-chang cheng-shih nien-piao* in *Erb-shih-wu shih pu-pien* [K'ai-ming ed.], 8253-95), Ja'far is listed as the first *hsing-sheng* s.a. 1212 (*ibid.*, 8290a). Wu's source could only have been *Yüan-shih* 152, 18a (Biography of Chao Jou), where the mention of the *hsing-sheng* Pa-cha (wrong for Cha-pa) refers, however, to an event of 1213. On this passage see Pelliot, "Sur un passage", 925-6. But Ja'far was actually appointed *darugaci* after the capture of Peking in 1215, and the title *hsing-sheng*, which is not mentioned in his biography, is the Chinese equivalent of *darugaci* (see below, p. 135, n. 3). Wu also does not include Samuqa in his list, probably because he had no access to the rare *T'ung-chien hsü-pien*, and no mention of Samuqa's appointment as *hsing-sheng* is found in the *Yüan-shih*. This event, however, is quoted in Shao Yüan-p'ing's *Yüan-shih lei-pien* (Sao-yeh-shan-fang ed., 1795) 1, 6a, from the *T'ung-chien hsü-pien*.

With the capture of Chung-tu in 1215, the Mongols established a firm foothold in North China. The city became the seat of the Ta-hsing administration in general charge of the Yen-ching district and henceforth the chief regional administration of Mongol occupied China.¹⁾

1) As is known, the Chin, following the Liao model, had established five main administrative centres called the Five Capitals. These were: Shang-ching, the Supreme or Upper Capital, seat of the Hui-ning administration (Hui-ning fu, the modern Pai-ch'eng, south of A-ch'eng, Kirin); Pei-ching, the Northern Capital, seat of the Ta-ting administration (Ta-ning ch'eng, Jehol); Nan-ching, the Southern Capital, seat of the K'ai-feng administration (K'ai-feng hsien, Honan); Tung-ching, the Eastern Capital, seat of the Liao-yang administration (Liao-yang hsien, Liaoning); and Hsi-ching, the Western Capital, seat of the Ta-t'ung administration (Ta-t'ung hsien, Shansi). In 1153, Hai-ning Wang, after having established the Southern Capital at Pien (K'ai-feng) and the Northern Capital at Ta-ting (formerly called Chung-ching, or Central Capital, as it had been named by the Liao), transferred the main capital from Shang-ching to Yen, or Yen-ching, which from then till 1215 was called Chung-tu, the Central Capital. On these changes see *Chin-shih* 5, 9b and the relevant sections of *cb.* 24 and 25. Ta-hsing became the administrative centre of the new capital and of its district, the Chung-tu lu. We may recall that the Chin, following this time the Sung, had divided their territory into nineteen administrative circuits or districts (*lu*), in turn subdivided into *fu*, *chou*, *hsien*, etc. The following is a table of the nineteen *lu* with the modern areas that they comprised and the registered population in households and individuals (the latter obtained by me on the 1:5 ratio) at the beginning of the thirteenth century:

1. Shang-ching (Kirin, N. Liaoning) 54,184 (270,920)
2. Hsien-p'ing (N. Liaoning) 71,816 (359,080)
3. Tung-ching (S. Liaoning) 142,733 (713,665)
4. Pei-ching (Jehol, S.-W. Liaoning, W. Kirin) 411,237 (2,056,185)
5. Hsi-ching (N. Shansi, S.-E. Suiyuan, S. Chahar) 458,144 (2,290,720)
6. Chung-tu (N. Hopei) 840,573 (4,202,865)
7. Nan-ching (Honan) 2,468,125 (12,340,625)
8. Ho-pei tung (S.-E. Hopei) 413,540 (2,067,700)
9. Ho-pei hsi (S.-E. Hopei, N. Honan) 726,560 (3,633,800)
10. Shan-tung tung (Central and E. Shantung) 1,101,259 (5,506,295)
11. Shan-tung hsi (W. Shantung, N. Kiangsu) 476,770 (2,383,850)
12. Ta-ming fu (S. Hopei, S.-W. Shantung) 494,414 (2,472,070)
13. Ho-tung pei (N. Shansi) 452,880 (2,265,400)
14. Ho-tung nan (S. Shansi, N.-W. Honan) 695,948 (3,479,740)
15. Ching-chao fu (S. Shensi) 278,676 (1,393,380)
16. Feng-hsiang (W. Shensi, E. Kansu) 196,119 (980,595)
17. Fu-yen (N. Shensi) 205,809 (1,029,045)
18. Ch'ing-yüan (N.-E. Kansu) 193,018 (965,090)
19. Lin-t'ao (N.-W. Kansu) 107,764 (538,820)

Total population: 9,789,569 households, i.e. about 48,950,000 individuals. The

Moreover, it was placed under official Khitan management, a fact which not only gave formal recognition to the role of the sinicized Khitan associates of Cinggis Qan, but also foreshadowed greater Chinese influence on the Mongol administration of the northern provinces. Shih-mo Ming-an, who had particularly distinguished himself in the capture of the former Chin capital, was made *hsing-sheng* of Yen-ching and received the title of *t'ai-pao* or grand protector. Yeh-lü A-hai shared with him the office of *hsing-sheng* and was made *t'ai-shih* or grand preceptor. T'u-hua, the younger brother, was created *tsung-ling yeke noyan*, as well as *t'ai-fu* or grand tutor.¹⁾

The Second Phase, 1216-1229

At the end of 1215 Cinggis Qan returned to Mongolia leaving his generals to carry on the war in the south. Muqali, Samuqa, Tolun-cerbi

above figures, based on the last national census (1207-8), are from the Geographical Monograph of the *Chin-shih* (ch. 24-26). Cf. *Hsü Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* (Wan-yu wen-k'u ed.), 2885b-2886a.

The Chung-tu lu was re-established as the Yen-ching lu in 1215 (*Yüan-shih* 58, 3a); however, the name Chung-tu, both as the name of the city and of the district, is occasionally found in texts relating to the period between 1215 and 1264, when the capital was renamed Chung-tu by Qubilai. See, e.g., *ibid.* 4, 11a, 20b, 21b; 150, 10a. Pelliot has already noted that this "must be a survival in Mongolian and in texts translated from Mongol originals of the name the Mongols used at the time of the conquest of 1215; for we have in Mongolian Jungdu (=Peking) in the *Secret History* (§§ 247, 248, 251, 252, 273)." (*Notes on Marco Polo, I*, 142; cf. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 126 n. 1.)

1) See the biographies of these personages, *Yüan-shih* 150, 18a; 9b-10a; 149, 23a. According to Ming-an's biography, he was actually appointed *t'ai-fu* or grand tutor, the title also conferred on Yeh-lü T'u-hua. Since it seems likely that the three Khitans were regarded by their followers as the *san-shih* or three teachers (one of the traditional groups of elder statesmen assisting the emperor), I follow T'u Chi in amending *t'ai-fu* to *t'ai-pao* (see *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 49, 11b). The expression *hsing chung-shu-sheng shih* in the biography of A-hai is clearly a mistake for *hsing shang-shu-sheng shih*, for there was no *chung-shu-sheng* in Cinggis Qan's time. Thus, Pelliot's statement in *TP* 27 (1930), 47, that "... Genghis-khan l'avait (i.e. Yeh-lü A-hai—I.R.) en effet nommé *t'ai-che* en 1214 et mis à la tête du Grand-Sécretariat..." is incorrect. We know only indirectly that Ming-an was appointed *hsing-sheng*. In the biography of his son Hsien-te-pu it is stated that he inherited his father's office of "Yen-ching *hsing-sheng*" upon the latter's death in 1216 (*Yüan-shih* 150, 18a). On Hsien-te-pu see *below*, pp. 122, n. 1; 123, n. 1; 135, n. 3. The *hsing-sheng* of Yen-ching lu was therefore established in 1215 with Ming-an and A-hai as senior officials in charge of it. T'u-

and the Chinese and Khitan defectors with their respective armies continued their attacks on towns and fortresses still held by the Jurchens in Hopei, Jehol, Liaoning, and Shansi. By the end of 1216 the Mongols controlled virtually all the territory "beyond the mountains", i.e. the border region beyond the Chü-yung Pass, and the north-eastern provinces. Hsi-ching was eventually conquered at the beginning of 1217. In the eighth month (3 September-1 October) of this year, Cinggis nominated Muqali grand preceptor (*t'ai-shih*), prince of state (*kuo-wang*), and general regional commander (*tu-hsing-sheng*), and entrusted him with the supreme command of the operations in China.¹) In the following years, while Cinggis was engaged in the Khwarezmian war, Muqali and his generals fought the Chin on several fronts, gradually breaking the strong resistance offered by the Jurchen army, but not without suffering occasional reverses. The Chin had also to contend with the Sung, against whom they had resumed hostilities in 1217, as well as with the unpredictable Tanguts. The conflict thus became a four-cornered one where generals changed sides with amazing dexterity. All attempts at negotiating peace between the Chin and the Mongols ended in failure owing to the latter's unacceptable conditions.

By the time Muqali died in 1223, the Mongols had completed the conquest of Hopei and controlled most of Shensi, Shansi, and Shantung. The death of Muqali caused a setback in the operations. The Chin took advantage of it to reconquer a number of districts north of the river,

hua's Sino-Mongol hybrid title *tsung-ling yeke noyan* can be rendered "great leader in general command". It was almost certainly another designation of his office of supreme commandant of the Khitan and Han armies.

1) *Yüan-ch'ao ming-ch'ên shih-lüeh* 1, 4; *Yüan-shih* 119, 4a. Cf. *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 8a-b, where his title of *ping-ma ta-yüan-shuai* is also listed. The *Secret History* § 202 records (s.a. 1206) only the title *güi-ong*, i.e. *kuo-wang*, no doubt because this was Muqali's principal title and the one by which he was commonly known. In the *Altan tobci* of bLo.bzañ bsTan-'jin (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), II, 53, his titles are given as *güi-ong cingsang tayisi* (= *kuo-wang cheng-hsiang t'ai-shih*). As suggested by Pelliot et Hambis, 364, Cinggis' conferment of the title of *kuo-wang* on Muqali in September 1217 was probably only a formal ratification of "une désignation populaire que les Chinois de la Chine du Nord donnaient déjà à Muqali depuis quelques années." Cf. Ledyard's remarks in *JAOS* 83 (1963), 238 n. 28. On the conflicting dates of the conferment see W. Hung in *HJAS* 14 (1951), 482.

and the Sung to extend their authority in eastern Shantung. It took the Mongols, under the leadership of Daisun and Bōl, the brothers and son of Muqali respectively, another four years of bitter fighting to dislodge them. In the meantime Cinggis had concluded his Western Campaign and had set out again against Hsi-Hsia. This war, his last, brought him back to China, where he died south of the Liu-p'an shan in August 1227. The conqueror's demise, the election of the new emperor (which took two years), and also the death of Bōl in 1228 brought to a standstill the operations against Chin. It was left to Cinggis' son Ögödei, elected *qaγan* in September 1229, to resume the war and conclude it successfully.¹⁾

This second phase, covering about fifteen years, witnessed several interesting developments. The departure of Cinggis and part of his army for the north in 1215-16 definitely marked a turning point in the war. From 1216 to 1230 this was directed and carried out by the emperor's deputies (Muqali till 1223, and Bōl till 1228) without direct participation of the court, except for a brief period in 1226-7 when Cinggis was campaigning in Kansu and Ninghsia.²⁾ Cinggis' involvement in the Khwarezmian war had reduced considerably the number of Mongol officers and men that could be deployed in China; consequently the Mongol generals had to rely more and more on the Han auxiliary forces. The trend towards defection, particularly among Chinese leaders, shows a marked rise as a result of a) the continued activity of the Chinese and Khitan officials already on the Mongol side, and b) the progressive retreat of the Chin armies. The political and military role of the Chinese defectors in this phase of the war cannot be underestimated. A study of their activity in these crucial years makes one doubt whether the Mongol forces alone would have been able to

1) On the campaigns in China 1216-29 see the *Yüan-shih* 1, 19a-23b; *Hsin Yüan-shih* 3, 8b-18b; *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 3, 17a-35a; Sun K'o-k'uan, *Meng-ku ch'u-ch'i chih chün-lüeh yü Chin chih peng-k'uei*, 48 ff. Cf. Franke, *IV*, 270 ff.; Martin, ch. VII, IX, and X. On Cinggis' Western Campaign the best account is still found in Barthold, 393 ff.

2) On the date of Cinggis' expedition against Hsi-Hsia see my "*Hsi-yu lu*", 64-5 n. 140.

conquer *and hold* the northern provinces. The most important figures among them were the following:¹⁾

1216	Ho Shih	? - 1257	Chinese	Pei-ching (Jehol)
	Wang Chao	1158-1237	Chinese	Chien-chou (Shansi)
	Liu Hui	? - ?	Chinese	Chien-chou (Shansi)
1218	Tu Feng	1190-1256	Chinese	P'ing-yao (Shansi)
	Chang Jou	1190-1268	Chinese	Ho-nei (Hopei)
	Ho Po-hsiang	? - 1259	Chinese	I-chou (Hopei)
	Chou Hsien-ch'en	? - 1234+	Chinese	Ting-hsiang (Shansi)
	Liang Ying	1191-1256	Chinese	Fen-chou (Shansi)
	Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai	1189-1243	Khitan	Chung-tu (Hopei)
1219	Wang Shan	1183-1243	Chinese	Kao-ch'eng (Hopei)
	Chin Ho	fl. 1219-1225	Chinese	Ch'ü-wo (Shansi)
1220	Yen Shih	1182-1240	Chinese	Ch'ang-ch'ing (Shantung)
	Liu T'ung	? - 1256	Chinese	Ch'i-ho (Shantung)
	Shih Kuei	? - 1223	Chinese	Hsin-t'ai (Shantung)
1221	Chang Lin	? - 1227	Chinese	?
1222	Nieh Kuei	ca. 1180-1235	Chinese	Shou-yang (Shansi)
	Wu Hsin	ca. 1165-1232	Chinese	Yung-ho (Shansi)
1226	Chang Jung ²⁾	1182-1265	Chinese	Li-ch'eng (Shantung)
1227	Li Ch'üan	? - 1231	Chinese	Wei-chou (Shantung)
	T'an	? - 1262	Chinese	Wei-chou (Shantung)
	*Wang Chen	1193-1257	Chinese	Nan-lo (Hopei)
	*Meng Te	fl. 1225-1295	Chinese	Chi-nan (Shantung)
	*Liang Chung	? - ?	Chinese	?

* The year of defection is not known.

The greater reliance which the Mongols placed on the Chinese military leaders inevitably brought about increased Chinese participation in the control and management of the conquered territories. This is shown by the number of regional administrations (*hsing-sheng*)

1) This and the previous list are by no means exhaustive: many more names could be added. In selecting, I have been greatly helped by two important studies: Otagi Matsuo, "Genchō no tai Kanjin seisaku", in *Tōa-kenkyūjōbō* 23 (1943), 606-723 (esp. pp. 612-26); and Sun K'o-k'uan, "Yüan-tai Han-chün jen-wu piao", in *Ch'ing-chu Chu Chia-hua hsien-sheng ch'i-shih sui lun-wen chi, Ta-lu tsa-chih t'e-k'an* 2 (1962), 331-6. The racial origin of the Khitan and Jurchen defectors is well established, but it cannot be excluded that some of the people listed as Chinese may in fact be of Khitan or, less likely, of Jurchen origin. As is known, a considerable number of Khitans and Jurchens had assumed Chinese surnames. However, none of the biographies of the Chinese defectors in these lists records such an event.

2) To distinguish this Chang Jung from his namesake in the previous list, I shall refer to him as Chang Jung².

established in these areas with Chinese officials in charge of them, as well as by the growth and expansion of Chinese-controlled local military administrations such as the *yüan-shuai-fu* and *tsung-kuan-fu*.¹⁾ These administrations directed the affairs not only of prefectures (*chou*) belonging to a *hsing-sheng* but also of prefectures outside the jurisdiction of the *hsing-sheng*. Although the *hsing-sheng* controlled, at least in theory, the largest administrative units corresponding broadly to the *lu* of Chin, the confused military situation did not permit a clear and stable definition of administrative boundaries (it was not unusual in this period for a district to change hands several times within two

1) The following is a list of *hsing-sheng* established between 1214 and 1228:

1214	Hsüan-p'ing (Chahar)	Samuqa	Mongol
1215	Yen-ching lu (Hopei)	Shih-mo Ming-an	Khitan
	Yen-ching lu (Hopei)	Yeh-lü A-hai	Khitan
	Pei-ching lu (Jehol)	Shih Ping-chih	Chinese
	Pai-hsi (Jehol)	T'a-pen (*Tabun)	Uighur
	*Liao-tung	Yeh-lü Nieh-erh-ko	Khitan
1216	Yen-ching lu (Hopei)	Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu	Khitan
	Yen-ching lu (Hopei)	Ja'far Hōja	Inner Asian
1217	Shan-hsi lu	Chia-ku T'ung-chu	Jurchen
1220	Tung-p'ing lu (Shantung)	Yen Shih	Chinese
1221	Ho-tung lu (Shensi)	Shih T'ien-ying	Chinese
1224	Huai-nan lu (Shantung)	Chang Lin	Chinese
1226	Chi-nan lu (Shantung)	Chang Jung ²	Chinese
1227	Huai-nan lu (Shantung)	Li Ch'üan	Chinese
1228	Yen-ching lu (Hopei)	Wang Chi	Chinese
	*Ta-ming lu (Hopei)	Liang Chung	Chinese
	*Ta-ming lu (Hopei)	Wang Chen	Chinese

The date of establishment of *hsing-sheng* in the districts marked with an asterisk is uncertain. From the above list it appears that between 1216 and 1228 over 80% of new appointments were Chinese. Unfortunately, I cannot produce at present a comparable list of *yüan-shuai-fu* and *tsung-kuan-fu* established in these years; their extent, however, can be gauged from the biographies of the defectors, in particular Shih T'ien-hsiang, Tung Chün, Ho Shih, Wang Shan, Wang I, Ho Po-hsiang, Liu T'ung, Shih Kuei, Chao Chin, and Liu Min. In view of the absence of a clear division of administrative authority in this period, the functions of the *yüan-shuai-fu* are practically indistinguishable from those of the *tsung-kuan-fu*. On the *hsing-sheng* in the early Yüan see Maeda Naonori's important article "Genchō *gyōshō* no seiritsu katei" in *Shigaku-zasshi* 56 (1945), 575-646, which supersedes the earlier studies by Aoyama Kōryō in *Ichimura bakase koki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō* (Tokyo, 1933), 1-7, and Aoki Tomitarō in *Shigaku-zasshi* 51 (1940), 480-502, 614-45. Cf. also Iwamura Shinobu in *Tōhō-gakubō* 32 (1962), 119 ff.

or three years). Therefore, numerous *chou* were actually outside the administration of the *hsing-sheng* and remained within the jurisdiction of local army commanders (*yüan-shuai*, *tsung-kuan*, *chieh-tu-shih*, etc.).

The Chinese generals in charge of these regional and local administrations, while depending on the Mongol supreme command as far as military operations were concerned, were given *carte blanche* in the administration of their military districts. Express statements to this effect are found in the defectors' biographies, usually accompanying the conferment of the office of *hsing-sheng*, or a general's rank. The standard formula is *p'ien-i hsing-shih* (or *p'ien-i ts'ung-shih*) "plenipotentiary".¹⁾ All these top ranking officials acted as deputies of the Mongols, and the symbol of such delegated authority was the Golden Tiger Tablet, on which the identical formula was engraved.²⁾ Since these districts, ranging from one or two prefectures to ten or more,³⁾ were administered by the Chinese military leaders with full discretionary powers, they often became their private domains and eventually turned into hereditary fiefs, because the office-holders were able to pass their titles on to their sons.

Towards the end of the second phase, the most powerful Han overlords were the following: Shih T'ien-ni and T'ien-tse in Chen-ting, Chang Jou in Pao-chou (Hopei), Liu Ni in Ta-t'ung (Shansi), Yen Shih in Tung-p'ing, Chang Jung² in Chi-nan, and Li Ch'üan and his son T'an in I-tu (Shantung). While these and several others extended their authority over new areas by military conquest, Chinese officials were playing an increasingly important role in the predominantly Khitan central administration of Yen-ching.

1) See the biographies of Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko, Hao Ho-shang, Tung Chün, Ho Shih, Tu Feng, Chang Jou, Li T'an, etc.

2) See *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 15a, and *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 2b, where the text of the Chinese inscription is quoted. Cf. *Haneda bakase*, p. 10 of the French text.

3) The largest domain was probably Yen Shih's, which, besides Tung-p'ing proper, included twelve *chou* in Western and Southwestern Shantung and Northern Kiangsu (Shan-tung hsi lu and part of Ta-ming-fu lu). See Yüan Hao-wen, *I-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi* 26, 3b (*shen-tao-peï* of Yen Shih); Abe Takeo, "Gendai chishikijin to kakyō" ("Intellectuals in the Yüan Dynasty and the *K'o-chü*"), *Sbirin* 42 (1959), 896-7.

Yen-ching, as we have seen, had been placed by Cinggis under Khitan management. Although the original team lasted less than a year, the administration remained in Khitan hands, but with a growing number of Chinese employed in it.¹⁾ Inner Asian Moslems in the Mongol service were also associated for the first time with Khitan and Chinese in the *hsing-sheng*, thus setting the pattern for the multi-racial administration of the country in the following decades.²⁾ In 1228 Wang Chi,

1) Shih-mo Ming-an died in 1216 and was succeeded by his son Hsien-te-pu. A-hai accompanied Cinggis back to Mongolia in 1215-6, and T'u-hua, as leader of the Khitan-Chinese army, resumed the military operations against Chin under Muqali's orders. After A-hai's death in 1222 his office of military commander of Yen-ching passed to his second son Mien-ssu-ko (see the respective biographies of these personages). However, effective authority remained with Hsien-te-pu, as attested by the *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 5b-6a; B, 13b (Waley, 53, 133), the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 23a (cf. also *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 9b), and by Sung Tzu-chen in *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 57, 13a (*shen-tao-pei* of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai). See my "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai", 199 and 364 n. 88. Evidence for the presence of Chinese officials (former Chin bureaucrats) in Yen-ching is supplied by contemporary authors. See the *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 11b, and the *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 8a ff.; B, 13b ff. (Waley, 59 ff., 133 ff.). Cf. Ch'en Yüan, *YCHP* 6 (1929), 1007 ff. The *Hsi-yu chi*, one of our main sources for this period, covers the year 1218-1228.

2) When Cinggis returned to the north he left Ja'far Hōja in charge of (*liu-shou*) Yen-ching with the other generals, and appointed him "general (*tu daruqaci*)" of the territory north of the river (*Yüan-shih* 120, 7a). In the *Yüan-shih* 152, 18a, Ja'far is called *hsing-sheng* (see above, p. 114 n. 5). In the *Meng-Ta pei-lu* of 1221 he is listed among the generals and meritorious officials. Chao Hung says that he was then an old man, living in Yen-ching and "taking part in public affairs" (*ibid.*, 10b). From the *Hsi-yu chi*, where he is mentioned twice (B, 14a and 15a; Waley, 135 and 137), it appears that in 1224-5 he was acting as emissary of Cinggis, and that he was also associated with Hsien-te-pu in the government of Yen-ching. Li Chih-ch'ang calls him *hsüan-ch'ai* "commissioner, envoy", a Chinese term frequently used to render the Mongolian *daruqaci*, "chief, governor, resident commissioner", i.e. the office of the local representative of Mongol authority in a conquered country. See below, p. 135, nn. 2 and 3. Clearly, Ja'far's *hsing-sheng* also corresponds to his office of *tu-daruqaci*. Now Muqali was appointed *tu-hsing-sheng* only in the latter part of 1217, and he died in 1223; his son Bōl, although in charge of the operations, was often absent from China. It is therefore likely that Ja'far, who had been left as chief representative of Cinggis Qan in North China prior to the appointment of Muqali, deputized for him and later for his son while they were busy campaigning in the south or were absent from Yen-ching. This seems to be in agreement with the *Meng-Ta pei-lu* and the *Hsi-yu chi*. Ja'far, an old and loyal friend of Cinggis, probably controlled *inter alia* the activity of the Khitan and Chinese officials. I think that already at this stage it was a deliberate policy of the Mongol rulers to place people of different nationalities in the same office so that they would check each other.

a Chinese official, was actually put in charge of the *hsing-sheng*, although apparently only for a short time.¹⁾

Chinese influence in the administration of the northern provinces also received a powerful boost through the activity of the Taoist Ch'üan-chen church, which had now become an influential body owing to the personal patronage of Cinggis Qan.²⁾ The Ch'üan-chen society was on the one hand protected by the Mongol court, and on the other it was closely allied with the Khitan leaders and the ex-Chin officialdom.³⁾ The extensive and opportune use that the Taoist leaders made of tax-exemption and other important privileges obtained from the court, as well as their close relationship with the local authorities, all helped considerably towards the creation of a united front of Chinese and sinophile officials. Their basic aim was to spare the country from destruction and to preserve Han culture and institutions.⁴⁾ An act

1) Wang Chi was appointed "to direct the administration in Yen-ching" (*ling-sheng Yen-ching*) by order of Tolui, then regent of the empire. See *Yüan-shih* 153, 4b. It was in 1228 that Tolui had also entrusted Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and Tācar, a Mongol, with an inquiry into banditry in Yen-ching. Hsien-te-pu, the governor, was incriminated owing to his connections with some of the criminals. He must have been suspended during the inquiry, and Wang Chi, a close friend of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, appointed in his place. However, Hsien-te-pu was later re-instated. See my "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai", 199. Wang Chi, a former protégé of Tolun-cerbi and Yeh-lü A-hai, was one of the leading Chinese administrators in the Mongol service. On him, besides his biography in *Yüan-shih* 153, 2b-5a, see the *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 6b, 12a; B, 15b, 16a, 22a (where he is referred to as "provisionally in charge of the administration"); *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 7b, 15a; Sun K'o-k'uan, *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 12 (1946), 183.

2) On the Ch'üan-chen society see Waley, 13 ff., and my two articles, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai", 195 ff., and the "*Hsi-yu lu*" (esp. pp. 12 n. 10 and 42 n. 17 for the essential bibliography on the subject). Cf. also the recent articles by Kubo Noritada in *Tōyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō* 29 (1963), 21-76.

3) See the *Hsi-yu chi*, *passim*. Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, *alias* Ch'ang-ch'un (1148-1227), the celebrated patriarch of the Ch'üan-chen sect in Cinggis' time, was on very friendly terms with Yeh-lü T'u-hua, Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu, Wang Chi, and the local Chinese intelligentsia. See *below*, n. 4.

4) This question has been dealt with in detail by Ch'en Yüan in his masterly work *Nan-Sung ch'u Ho-pei tao-chiao k'ao* (*New Taoist Societies in the Northern Provinces at the Beginning of the Southern Sung Dynasty*), Catholic University of Peking Book Series No. 8 (Peking, 1941), *ch.* 1 and 2. Cf. also Yao Ts'ung-wu, *Tung-pei shih lun-ts'ung* (Taipei, 1959), II, 175 ff. In the *Hsüan-feng ch'ing-hui lu* (on which see my "*Hsi-yu lu*", 69-72 n. 168) published in 1232—a text which can be regarded as a sort of spiritual testament of Ch'ang-ch'un—the Taoist patriarch stresses the need to restore peace

symbolizing the unity of purpose of the Chinese in these years was the rebuilding of the Confucian temple school (*miao-hsüeh*) in Yen-ching by Wang Chi, the same official who, as a friend of Ch'ang-ch'un and supporter of the Ch'üan-chen church, had helped to establish the Pai-yün kuan.¹⁾ Before the end of our second phase, this Taoist church, with its headquarters in Yen-ching and branch temples in Shansi, Hopei, and Shantung, had become a rallying point of unemployed officials, displaced scholars, and of people in distress generally.²⁾

Although the connection between the Khitan-Chinese intelligentsia in Yen-ching and the Chinese overlords in the provinces is not altogether clear,³⁾ the same trend of growing Chinese cultural influence is apparent there. Our sources contain numerous references to relief measures, fiscal reforms, administrative re-organization, and the promotion of agriculture and education carried out in the areas governed by the Chinese military leaders.⁴⁾ The districts where the revival

in the northern provinces and recommends the appointment of Chinese officials as administrators of the country for the Mongols (*ibid.*, 8a-b of the Tao-tsang ed.). See Waley, 24-5.

1) See *Yüan-shih* 153, 4b, and *Hsi-yu chi*, B, 22a (Waley, 155-6). The restoration of the original K'ung-tzu miao was carried out by imperial order in January 1234. See *Yüan-shih* 2, 4a. On the Pai-yün kuan, the headquarters of the Ch'üan-chen sect, see the "*Hsi-yu lu*", 79 n. 190.

2) The temples appropriated by the Ch'üan-chen followers provided shelter and food for many refugees from the south. See *Yüan-shih* 202, 10a (Biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi); "*Hsi-yu lu*", 77 n. 189, 83 n. 221. The requisition of Buddhist temples for this purpose was one of the major causes of the famous dispute between the Taoists and the Buddhists in the thirteenth century. On this controversy see J. Thiel's study in *Monumenta Serica* 20 (1961), 1-81.

3) From the *Hsi-yu chi* we learn that Ch'ang-ch'un had among his friends and admirers powerful men like Li Ch'üan, Liu Min, Wang Chi, the Yeh-lü brothers, and Chia-ku Tung-chu, but it is difficult, of course, to gauge the extent of their friendship and support. However, the Ch'üan-chen sect was quite active in the provinces, a fact on which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's *Hsi-yu lu* supplies ample evidence; and this activity went on no doubt with the connivance and help of the local authorities. We know, for instance, that the cutting of the blocks of the *Tao-tsang*, undertaken at P'ing-yang fu (Shansi) during Ögödei's reign, was entrusted to Tu Feng, a defector of 1218, later appointed *darugaci* of Ch'in-chou. See the Chinese text of the Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1240 in Ts'ai Mei-piao, 7 and Pl. 2. For a translation of the inscription see Cleaves, *HJAS* 23 (1960-1), 65.

4) Among the notable officials who carried out these measures in their districts

of Han institutions was stronger were Chen-ting in Hopei and Tung-p'ing in Shantung. The latter, in particular, saw the gradual setting up under Yen Shih of a complete bureaucratic organization directed and staffed by former Chin officials.¹)

The adoption of the *lu* system of Chin, as well as the widespread use of Chinese bureaucratic practice in the regional administration amply testifies to the cultural inroads made by the Han officials.²) Several

were: Liu Po-lin in Wei-ning (Chahar), Hao Ho-shang and Liang Ying in T'ai-yüan (Shansi), Tu Feng in Ch'in-chou (Shansi), T'ien Hsiung in Ching-chao (Shensi), Shih T'ien-tse in Chen-ting (Hopei), Tung Chün in Kao-ch'eng (Hopei), Chang Jou in Hsiung-chou, I-chou, An-chou, and Pao-chou (Hopei), Wang Shan in Chung-shan (Hopei), Wang Chen in Ta-ming (Hopei), Wang Yü in Chao-chou (Hopei), Nieh Kuei in P'ing-chou, Ting-chou, Hsing-chou and Chin-chou (Hopei), Ho Shih in Po-chou (Shantung), Yen Shih in Tung-p'ing (Shantung). Their reforms and administrative activity are described, often in detail, in their biographies and funerary inscriptions. They include relief measures, economic and fiscal policies such as tax-exemptions, tax-equalization, and control of usury (Liu Po-lin, Hao Ho-shang, Shih T'ien-tse, Ho Shih, Tu Feng, T'ien Hsiung, Wang Chen, Yen Shih, Wang Yü), bureaucratic re-organization with appointment of "civil" officials (Chang Jou, Liang Ying, Wang Shan, Yen Shih, Nieh Kuei), establishment of schools, and promotion of education and Confucianism (Tung Chün, Chang Jou, Wang Shan, Yen Shih, Nieh Kuei).

1) See Sun K'o-k'uan, *Yüan-ch'ü ju-hsüeh* (Taipei, 1953), 1-25; Abe, 893-906; Yüan Kuo-fan, "Tung-p'ing Yen Shih mu-fu jen-wu yü hsing-hsüeh ch'u-k'ao", *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 23 (1962), 383-6.

2) Chao Hung who, as Sung envoy to Muqali, was in North China in 1220 has this to say: "In recent years Jurchen renegade officials have been employed [by the Mongols]. . . In the last two years, since the Chin officials who deserted and surrendered to them had nowhere to go, they wished to be employed by them. At first they taught them how to write official documents. In their relations with the Chin kingdom they employ the Chinese script. Last year in spring, I, Hung, frequently saw [specimens of] the documents that they issue. They still use [the words] *Ta Ch'ao* ('Great Dynasty') [when addressing the Chin]. Furthermore, they used to give year-titles [according to the animal cycle,] like 'year of the hare' or 'year of the dragon'. Only last year they changed [to the Chinese cycle] and called it 'the *keng-ch'en* year'. The present [year] is called 'the *hsin-ssu* year', and so on. Moreover, since they admire the Mongols and regard them as a powerful nation, they call their state *Ta-Meng-ku kuo* ('State of the Great Mongols'). This also has been taught to the Mongols by the Jurchen renegade officials. . . As to the official documents that they issue at present, they have been taught entirely by renegade officials [of Chin] who can write and who pretend to understand these matters. . . The Chin caitiffs' renegade officials have certainly taught them to make their birthday a holiday; and undoubtedly they have also taught them to change the year titles. . . The Mongols have inherited the Chin caitiffs' system. They too have set up the offices of *shang-shu-ling* in general

years before Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai began his programme of administrative centralization by establishing a secretariat (*chung-shu-sheng*) in Qara-Qorum, all the formal elements were already in existence in North China. Moreover, the advice given in these years to the Mongol court by Chinese counsellors adumbrated many of his later social and economic reforms.¹) The increasing number of Chinese officials enjoying

control [of state affairs], *tso yu hsiang*, *tso yu p'ing-chang*, and others. They have also established [the posts of] *p'ai-shih*, *yüan-shuai* and so on . . . all this has been taught to them by the Chin caittiffs' rebel officials. Those who are sent to supervise the people are called *hsüan-ch'ai*. The overlords (*shou-ch'en*) of individual regions are called *chieb[-tu-] shih* . . . This is because, having lived a long time in Yen-ching, they have inherited the former Chin system." (*Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 3a, 4b-5b, 14b-15b.). Although some of the information that Chao Hung picked up in North China—mainly in Yen-ching—may not be accurate, the overall picture is reliable. However, he was not aware that the "Chin renegades" had been assisting the Mongols for well over a decade. In another passage (*ibid.*, 3a) he also claims that Cinggis' thorough acquaintance with conditions in the Chin kingdom was gained by him when, as a young man, "he was enslaved by the Chin for over ten years". This is of course a groundless statement, but it confirms, nonetheless, what has already been said about Cinggis' knowledge of China. A further example of the adoption of the Chin system is the priority given to the "left" in official rank. The Mongols themselves honoured the centre, the right and the left in that order. See *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 7b. Although during Cinggis' and Ögödei's reigns the Chin practice was followed in the administration, the Mongols later reverted to their own custom, and seniority became associated with the right. See *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 56, 3a, and *below*, p. 137-8, n. 2.

1) One of the earliest and most energetic advocates of reform was Kuo Pao-yü. He urged Cinggis to promulgate new laws and ordinances for North China to replace the Mongol customary law (*jasay*), and he submitted a program of reforms which included the following measures: 1. to stop indiscriminate killing of the population during the military operations; 2. to reserve capital punishment only for major crimes and administer beatings for all other offences; 3. when recruiting Mongol and "alien" (*se-mu*) soldiers, to regard each adult male as eligible for military service according to the Mongol custom. However, in the case of Chinese subjects, to recruit only one adult male from families having four *ch'ing* of land and comprising three adult males, and to regard as adult only men between the age of fifteen and sixty. This rule was to be applied to military and post-service households alike; 4. to grant up to 1 *ch'ing* of (tax-free?) land to households of civilian artisans (*min-chiang*); 5. to condemn the activity of the Buddhist and Taoist clergy which was detrimental to the state and the people. See *Yüan-shih* 149, 11a-b. It is unlikely that these measures were recommended as early as 1211-12, but they were certainly put forth within the following decade and, although there is no evidence that they were carried out, they may still be regarded as the forerunners of the administrative reforms launched by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai at the beginning of Ögödei's reign. As a matter of fact, the son of Kuo Pao-yü, Te-hai, also urged the introduction of selective examinations for

discretionary powers and the formation of separate areas of influence without really effective central co-ordinating agency resulted, however, in a somewhat indiscriminate use of official prerogatives. Cumulation of ranks and honorary titles, duplication of offices, and transformation of office designations into purely honorary titles became quite common.¹⁾ Chinese leaders could, on the strength of their tablets and seals of authority, actually assume ranks and offices and in turn confer marks of authority on other officials.²⁾ As we shall presently see, this power derived essentially from the status that the Han defectors held within the Mongol social order. But its growth must also be ascribed in considerable measure to the favourable climate created by the personality of some of the Mongol leaders and, in particular, by Muqali. Muqali is, in my view, the key figure in the Sino-Mongol exchange of this period, and a study of his life is long overdue.³⁾ As Cinggis' chief representative in China he wielded enormous influence in these most critical years. Serving in the country as a leading general from the very beginning of the invasion, he came early into contact with the Chinese defectors, several of whom he personally introduced to

Confucians as well as for the clergy, a measure for which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai alone is usually credited (see *ibid.*, 13b-14a). Ch'u-ts'ai's eloquent humanitarian arguments had been propounded many years earlier by Yeh-lü A-hai (*ibid.* 150, 9b), and his campaign against usury had precedents in the fiscal policies carried out by Shih T'ien-tse and Yen Shih in Hopei and Shantung. See their respective biographies.

1) See, e.g., the biographies of Shih T'ien-hsiang, Wang Chen, Shih Kuei, and Wang Hsün for cumulations of offices and titles. One of the office designations that became an empty title was *yü-shih ta-fu* or great censor. There was no censorate in this period, but three officials were given this rank: Yeh-lü A-hai's son Mangyutai, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien, and Wang Chi. See *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 49, 2a. *T'ai-shih*, also a purely honorific title, was held by both Muqali and Yeh-lü A-hai. The examples can be easily multiplied.

2) See *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 55, 1b (Biography of Tung Chün). Cf. the *Yuan-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* 5, 64, where the following passage from Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's obituary by Chao Yen is quoted: "The administrative offices (i.e. the chief officials) of the various districts made their own tallies and seals, and [on their strength] committed abuses without restraint." According to the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 14b-15a, those officials who earned distinction issued themselves the gold and silver and asked the Mongol ruler for permission to cast the tablet.

3) On Muqali see provisionally the biographies and epigraphical material listed by Pelliot in Pelliot et Hambis, 364-5, and the long note devoted to him, *ibid.*, 362-72.

Cinggis Qan.¹⁾ He was favourably impressed by their courage and skill, formed close ties of friendship with some of them, and throughout the latter part of his life he showed a sympathy for Chinese culture unusual for a Mongol. He was instrumental in obtaining from Cinggis a decree conferring immunity on Buddhist monks in 1219, the first of a long series of edicts granting privileges to the Chinese clergy.²⁾ His knowledge of China and his successful handling of the Chinese defectors must have played a considerable part in his appointment as supreme commander, as well as in Cinggis' bestowal on him of titles like *kuo-wang* and *t'ai-shih*. Later in the Yüan Chinese scholars were still well aware of Muqali's role, and it is not surprising to see him heading the list in Su T'ien-chüeh's biographies of famous men. His policy was continued by his son Böl, who also revealed an enlightened understanding of Chinese problems. Following their example, other Mongol military leaders showed partiality for the Chinese and recommended them for employment.³⁾

Although the political situation in China called for greater utilization of Chinese skill and personnel, and the personal inclinations of some Mongol leaders accounted to a great extent for the increased participation of Chinese in all spheres of activity, still the exact position of the Chinese in relation to Mongol society has so far remained unexplained. Our picture would be incomplete without attempting to describe the place that the Chinese defectors and their followers occupied within the framework of Mongolian society itself, since either by choice or by necessity they did belong to it. Until now we have

1) Notably Kuo Pao-yü and Shih T'ien-ni. Among the Chinese who defected to him were Li Shou-hsien, Shih T'ien-ying, T'ien Hsiung, Ho Shih, Yen Shih, and several others.

2) The text of the decree (in colloquial) is found in Nien-ch'ang's *Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai* (Taishō shinshū daizōkyō ed.) 49, 703a. It was translated by Waley in *Travels*, 8. Cf. Pelliot's remarks in *TP* 28 (1931), 415-6 and *below*, p. 133, n. 1. Shih T'ien-hsiang was the person who had originally introduced the Buddhist monks in question (Chung-kuan and Hai-yün) to Muqali. On the role of Shih T'ien-hsiang and Muqali, and the background of these events see Iwai Hirosato, *Nisshi bukkekyōshi ronkō* (Tokyo, 1957), 470 ff.

3) See the biographies of Böl in *Yüan-shih* 119, 8b-10a, and *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 27, 7a-8a.

described their actions and progress as seen from the point of view of the Chinese historian, who was prevented by his tradition-bound approach, as well by sheer lack of knowledge, from fitting them into any other pattern but that of his own society. Hence Chinese and Mongols appear as two distinct cultural and social groups, one possibly influencing the other, but otherwise separate throughout. Chinese officials may have loyally served the Mongols and earned glory during the dynasty and shame as "Han renegades" later; however, the measure of their success as well as their means of achieving it were reckoned in Chinese terms alone. But the Mongols had their mode of life, their own social forms and their peculiar *Weltanschauung*, all of which must be taken into account when dealing with the relations between the two societies.¹⁾

According to Dr. H. F. Schurmann, in the period of conquest (1210-34), the Mongols "were intent upon exploitation and did not enter into a symbiotic relationship with the conquered society".²⁾ If, as I think, the Khitan and Chinese military leaders and their subjects were also members of the "conquered society", then the above statement is not altogether correct. An analysis of the defectors' careers shows that they enjoyed a status and prerogatives comparable to those of the Mongolian élite. In fact, a comparison between them and the Mongolian nobility is most instructive.

From the primary sources studied by Vladimirtsov we learn that in Cinggis' time the aristocracy of the steppe was largely composed of *nököd*, the so-called "comrades" or "companions in arms". These were men from different clans and tribes who had voluntarily detached themselves from their former allegiance to join Cinggis. The latter's

1) Most of the works by modern and contemporary Chinese scholars, such as T'u Chi, Lü Ssu-mien, Wu Han, Meng Ssu-ming, Li Chieh, and Yao Ts'ung-wu, also fail to take into due consideration the Mongol point of view. Japanese scholars, on the other hand, have contributed much to the understanding of the true character of Chinese society during the Mongol rule. See in particular the works by Yanai Watari, Hattori Shirō, Aritaka Iwao, Abe Takeo, Wada Sei, Murakami Shōji, Otagi Matsuo, and Iwamura Shinobu.

2) *Economic Structure*, 2.

rise to power was actually due to a considerable degree to the assistance and services that he received from them in the difficult years. In reward for their loyalty and services, and also on account of their personality, they obtained a number of "tent-camps" (*ayil*) which could yield in time of war a hundred, a thousand, or sometimes ten-thousand warriors. This distribution of the nomadic population (*ulus*) into portions or fiefs (*qubi*) allotted to the *nököd* was registered in the special "Blue Book" I mentioned earlier, which was kept by the *jarγuci*.

The *nököd*'s functions were hereditary and the holder received the generic name of *noyan*. Their titles were conferred by direct investiture or patent (*jarliy*) and they received as token of authority the famous tablets (*gerege*). When a *nökör* joined Cinggis with his tribe, he was actually given the tribe as his own patrimony. It was a normal practice for Cinggis to accept an already constituted tribal unit, viz. a clan (*oboq*) or sub-clan (*yasun*), with all the dependants, confirm its chief as *noyan*, and decree, after a summary census, that it was a chiliarchy. In this way the chiliarchy became the basic unit of the Mongol empire. We know, moreover, that *nököd* were frequently employed as envoys and administrators, and that, in time of peace, they were household men who dealt with all kinds of domestic affairs and economic matters.¹⁾

Now the Khitan and Chinese defectors played in China the same role that the *nököd* had performed in Mongolia. By voluntarily submitting to Cinggis and by offering their services and people, they acquired the same rights of the *nököd*. They too earned the privilege of serving in the Guard, they were placed in command of troops drawn from their own subjects, and as military leaders (*noyad*) they received the same tablets of authority that their Mongol counterparts held from the court. Since they were put (or confirmed) in charge of their subjects — who, as we have seen, eventually became their patrimony—the Han officials, like the *nököd*, were required to take the census.²⁾ It was upon

1) *Régime sociale*, 110 ff. On the *nököd* cf. the important article by Mori Masao in *Shigaku-zasshi* 61 (1952), 690-716. See also O. Lattimore's remarks in his introduction to Martin, xiv-xv; and Pelliot et Hambis, 254. On the term *nökör* see J. Németh's study in *Acta Orientalia Hung.* 3 (1953), 1-23.

2) See *Yüan-shih* 148, 17a (Biography of Yen Shih); 149, 3a (Biography of Yeh-lü

submission of the census lists to the court or its representative that rank and authority were conferred on them. The greater the number of subjects, the greater the reward; 1) however, as in the tribal society, chiliarchies were given to the defectors in preference to any other Mongolian military rank. 2) The offices and titles held by them were likewise hereditary, and the pattern of rank inheritance shows remarkable conformity with the Mongol system. 3) Khitan and Chinese in the

Liu-ko); Yüan Ming-yüan, "Kao-ch'eng Tung Shih chia-chuan", *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 70, 3a (Biography of Tung Chün). Cinggis was always anxious to obtain the exact figure of his subjects. In the case of the Chinese defectors, they took the census themselves and submitted the lists (*bu-chi*) to the Mongol authorities. It is important to remember that most of the defectors went over to the Mongols at the head of sizable groups of people. These ranged from the members of their own household and villagers to the population of several districts and entire armies. The following are some figures quoted in the *Yüan-shih*. I-la Nieh-erh defected with several hundred people, Shih Ping-chih and Chao Jou with several thousand, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien with twelve thousand, Ho Shih with ten-thousand households and three thousand soldiers, Wang Hsün with over a hundred thousand households, Yen Shih with three-hundred thousand households. Kuo Pao-yü, Wang Yü, Ao-t'un Shih-ying and several others defected with their armies. In nearly all cases where figures are not supplied, the biographies still refer to the clan, local population, and followers who defected with their leader. On the counting of households for the Mongols in Koryö see Henthorn, 76-7.

1) Cf. *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 70, 3a, where it is stated that population figures submitted to the court by the military leaders in 1228 were exaggerated by them in order to obtain greater benefits.

2) Chiliarchies (*ch'ien-bu*) were conferred on Liu Po-lin, Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko, Chia-ku T'ung-chu, Shih-mo Po-tien-erh, Hao Ho-shang, T'ien Hsiung, Chang Jou, Liang Ying, Liu T'ung, Wang Chi and several others. The same pattern is evident in the treatment of the Korean defectors. See Henthorn, 84 n. 10, 104.

3) As is known, among the Mongols succession to leadership, and therefore inheritance of office and rank, was not governed by the law of primogeniture. This is shown by the pattern of succession to khanship in pre-Cinggis Qan times and, in the inheritance of property, by the role of the youngest son as "master of the hearth". According to Fang Chaoying, the early Mongols, like the Jurchen, and probably even the Shang peoples, may have practiced ultimogeniture (see Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices", 316-7, n. 12). However, there existed also a tendency to honour seniority; this was emphasized during Cinggis' rule and found expression in the *yasay*, which stated that the division of property is based on the rule that the eldest receives more than the other sons (cf. G. Vernadsky, "The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's *Yasa*", *HJAS* 3 [1938], 357; Vladimirtsov, 67, n. 1). Nevertheless, in the selection of a successor, seniority, although a factor of importance, was often overridden by considerations of ability. See Vladimirtsov, 66 ff.; E. E. Bakon, *Oboke, A Study of Social Structure in Eurasia* (New York, 1958), 57-8. If we turn to our defec-

Mongols' service were also employed as envoys, attendants, secretaries and administrators.¹⁾ Furthermore, designations such as *noyan*, *ba'atur* and *nökör* borne by these officials are often recorded in our sources.²⁾ Even the office of *jarγuci*, one of the highest and most exclusive, was actually conferred on a Chinese in Cinggis' time.³⁾

All this is sufficient evidence, in my opinion, to demonstrate that the North Chinese leaders were identified with and politically assimilated to the Mongolian élite. In other words, in the Mongol society they ranked as *nököd*, and the households they controlled were regarded as the *ayil* forming the *irgen* or *ulus* (which early acquired territorial connotations) belonging to them. However, in the areas of North China directly under Mongol control, the local population was regarded simply as *bölcud* or *injes*, i.e. as slaves, and treated accordingly.⁴⁾

tors, we see that their main offices and titles went in most cases to the eldest son (Yeh-lü T'u-hua, I-la Nieh-erh, Shih-mo Ming-an, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien, Liu Po-lin, Chang Jung, Shih T'ien-ying, Chang Jou, Ao-t'un Shih-ying, Wang Hsün, Liu Min, etc.). However, in some instances they passed on to younger sons or even to brothers (Yeh-lü A-hai, Hao Ho-shang, Ho Po-hsiang, Shih T'ien-ni); in the latter case seniority was clearly overridden by ability.

1) As the abovementioned Yeh-lü brothers, Nien-ho Chung-shan, Hao Ho-shang, Wang Chi, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Liu Min, etc.

2) Cf., e.g., the biographies of Hao Ho-shang, Chang Jou, Chang Jung² and Ti Shun. Ti Shun received from Muqali the appellation of *ch'a na-bo-erb* (= *caγ{tu} nökör* "faithful comrade"; cf. *Secret History* § 245), and his brother that of *chin na-bo-erb* (= *chin nökör*, a Sino-Mongol hybrid term meaning "golden, i.e. excellent, comrade").

3) Kuo Pao-yü, who according to his biography (*Yüan-shih* 149, 12b) was appointed *tuán-shih-kuan* after 1222. Under Ögödei another Chinese, Shih T'ien-lin (1217-1309), was appointed to this post (*ibid.* 153, 11a). As Ratchnevsky ("Über den mongolischen Einfluss", 11) has pointed out, only members of the royal family, the nobility, and the highest dignitaries could hold this office. It is significant that two Chinese actually gained access to it. According to T'u Chi (*Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 4, 9a), Liu Fu, another official in the Mongols' service, was made *tuán-shih-kuan* in 1234. T'u seems to be in error. Cf. *Yüan-shih* 146, 14b, and *Yüan-shih lei-pien* 2, 13a.

4) Thus, in 1213, over 100,000 households were gathered and transferred to Mongolia (*Yüan-shih* 147, 9a). Military colonies were established there with Chinese families deported at the beginning of the invasion. One of these was the famous Cinqai Balayasun or City of Cinqai, on which see *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 22b-23b; Waley, 34, 72; E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London 1888; rep. 1910), I, 60 n. 144; and Pelliot in *TP* 15 (1914), 628. Chinese craftsmen were transferred as far as Ch'ien-ch'ien chou (Kemkemci'üt) in Kirghiz territory. Cf. *Hsi-yu chi*, B, 10a; Waley, 124. On Kemkemci'üt or Kemci'üt see Pelliot et Hambis,

The imposition of Mongol social forms on the Chinese is also evident in their attitude towards the churches. First some Buddhist monks, then Ch'ang-ch'un and his "dependants", were classified as *darqad* and exempted from the customary taxes and services (*alba qubciri*, in Chinese *ch'ai-fa*).¹⁾ This meant that they were raised from the condition of slaves or serfs to that of freemen enjoying special privileges and immunity in exchange for certain important services—in their case praying for the health and good fortune of the ruler and bringing more subjects to him.²⁾

209, and *HJAS* 19 (1956), 399. There is plenty of evidence that the prisoners captured by the Mongols fell under the category of slaves (Ch. *ch'ü-k'ou*). See, e.g., *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 57, 16a-b. Cf. Aritaka Iwao, "Gendai dorei kō" in *Ogawa bakase kanreki kinen Shigaku chirigaku ronsō* (Kyoto, 1930), 323-78; Meng Ssu-ming, *Yüan-tai she-hui chieh-chi chih-tu*, *YCHP* Mon. Ser. No. 16 (Peiping, 1938), 170 ff.; Ratchnevsky, lxxxvi-xcix; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 81-2, n. 8. Although dislocation of people and subsequent absorption into the tribe took place on a considerable scale in the early years of the conquest, towards the end of the second phase the Mongol leaders were rewarded with grants of people and areas (*ch'eng-i* "cities and towns") in North China as hereditary apanages. See the *Yüan-shih* 119, 9a (Biography of Bōl), and *ibid.* 153, 4a (Biography of Wang Chi). The latter entry is important because it illustrates the role of Wang Chi as Cinggis' agent in the parcelling of the territory. Unfortunately, neither the location nor the size of the areas in question are mentioned in our sources. Much of the damage to the land and people of North China was actually done by the *a'uru'ud*, the military camps where the families of the Mongol soldiers lived. As Abe, 886, has pointed out, in the localities where these camps were established, the mulberry trees, which the peasants had raised with great care, were mercilessly destroyed together with all kinds of crops, and the land was turned into pastures for horses and sheep.

1) Regarding the first group, see the edict mentioned earlier (p. 128, n. 2). The concluding phrase of this edict is the following: "No one, irrespective of who he is, must show disrespect to them (i.e. the Buddhist monks in question—I.R.) *who rank as darqan*". My translation differs somewhat from Waley's, since I do not follow the punctuation of the text as given in the Taishō edition. Pelliot (*TP* 28 [1931], 415) expressed some reservations on Waley's rendering but did not offer any alternative. On *darqan*, a Turkic title adopted by the Mongols, see J. R. Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties d'après les documents chinois* (Paris, 1955), 14, 155; Vladimirtsov, 153; Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices", 322-5; *TP* 27 (1930), 32-3; and the articles by Han Ju-lin in *Studia Serica* 1 (1940-1), 155-84, and Etani Toshiyuki in *Tōyōshi-kenkyū* 22 (1963), 185-202. As far as I know, it is nowhere stated that Ch'ang-ch'un and his followers were also to rank as *darqad*. However, they must have been regarded as such in view of the privileges that they obtained from Cinggis. Cf. Schurmann, *op. cit.*, 323. On these privileges see my "*Hsi-yu lu*", 76 ff.

2) See *ibid.* In Cinggis' personal message of 8 December 1223 conveyed to Ch'ang-

The bond linking the invaders with their new allies was therefore one consecrated by the Mongol tradition. But the steppe-people were well aware of the impermanency of ties of loyalty, and the Mongol custom, following a long-established practice, required that the sons of nobles should serve for a period in the ruler's bodyguard. The Han defectors were no exception to the rule and were required to leave either one of their sons or a close relative at the Mongol encampment.¹⁾

Granted that the defectors were regarded as *nököd*, why did the Mongols confer Chinese official titles on them and why did they allow them to reconstitute a bureaucracy and administration along Chinese traditional lines?

The reason was a purely utilitarian one. Most of the Chinese titles that the court conferred, on the advice of the Khitan and other advisers, were meaningless to the Mongols themselves, but they carried of course great weight with the Chinese officials. They imparted lustre and prestige to them in the eyes of their own subjects and, what mattered even more, in the eyes of the enemy.

As to the re-establishment of the administrative apparatus, we have already seen that it was prompted by essentially practical needs: mobilization of troops, distribution and exploitation of useful groups like artisans and weavers, collection of taxes, goods and supplies, maintenance of post-relay stations, etc.—all duties for the effective perform-

ch'un by Chia Ch'ang, Cinggis asked the patriarch: "Have you won the common people [for me]?" (*Hsi-yu chi*, B, 13a, and *fu-lu*, 2a; Waley, 132.). This shows that Cinggis regarded the Chinese clergy also as "intermediaries" in gaining subjects. See Ratchnevsky, "Die mongolischen Grosskhane und die buddhistische Kirche", *Asiatica—Festschrift Friedrich Weller* (Leipzig, 1954), 490 and n. 2. Cf. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 6.

1) In old Turkic the son of a noble serving as hostage was called *turyaq*. The Mongols borrowed this term and by extension they applied it to an important section of the Guard. See Pelliot, *JA* 217 (1930), 265 No. 42; *TP* 27 (1930), 29-30. Among the defectors, Ho Shih, Chang Jou, Yen Shih, Wang Hsün and Liu Hui had their sons kept as hostages, while in the case of Yeh-lü A-hai, Shih T'ien-ni and Li Shouhsien it was the brother. On these "internal hostages", as Yang Lien-sheng defines them, see his article "Hostages in Chinese History", *HJAS* 15 (1952), 507-21 (rep. in *Studies in Chinese Institutional History* [Cambridge, Mass., 1961], 43-57), especially pp. 517-8. Cf. Henthorn, 105 and 118 n. 14.

ance of which local know-how became indispensable as the war went on. The Khitan and Han *nököd* were first put in charge of the people (*irgen*), then of the territorial unit—locality or district (?*cölge*)¹—where the people resided. The latter function did not exist in the steppe society. For it the Mongols employed the term *daru*—“to press”, i.e. the official seal, from which the noun *daruγa* ~ *daruγaci* derives.²) The Khitans and Chinese, on their part, regarded this function as perfectly normal and defined it in terms familiar to them: *hsing-sheng*, *liu-shou*, *chang-kuan* or *hsüan-ch’ai*, all of which rendered *daruγaci*.³) They then

1) *Cölge* is the Mongolian term for *lu* which appears in the later texts of the Yüan. See Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 57 8 n. 7. I am not certain, however, whether this term was already in use in Cinggis Qan’s time. On it see Pelliot in *TP* 27 (1930), 18-21, 195 n. 1, and 221, and L. Ligeti in *Acta Orientalia Hung.* 13 (1961), 222-3 n. 21.

2) On *daruγa* ~ *daruγaci* (Ch. transcr.: *ta-lu-hua* ~ *ta-lu-hua-ch’ib*) see Cleaves, *HJAS* 12 (1949), 57 n. 178, and 16 (1953), 237-55; Yao Ts’ung-wu, *Wen-shih chih-hsüeh pao* 12 (1963), 1-20; S. Jagchid, *ibid.* 13 (1964), 293-441. Cf. also Ratchnevsky, *Code*, 32 n. 3, and G. K. Ledyard, “The Establishment of Mongolian Military Governors in Korea in 1231”, *Phi Theta Papers* 6 (1961); Henthorn, 194 ff. As pointed out by Pelliot (*Notes sur l’histoire de la Horde d’Or* [Paris, 1950], 72-3 n. 1), *daru* must be understood in the sense of “affixing” a seal, rather than “oppressing” the people. For its equivalent in Turkic and Arabic-Persian see *ibid.*, and Juvaini, 105 n. 24. It is worth noting in this connection that in Cinggis’ and Ögödei’s time the Mongols used seals with Chinese inscriptions. See *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 9a-b, where Wang Kuo-wei points out that the imperial seal was patterned on that of the Chin emperor, and the edict of 1240, where the Chinese seal is visible. Cf. also the important remarks by Mostaert and Cleaves in “Trois documents mongols des Archives secrètes vaticanes”, *HJAS* 15 (1952), 495 n. 87, and Pelliot in *TP* 27 (1930), 35 ff. This practice was continued during the following reigns in China and in Persia, with seals in Mongolian (Uighur) script and Chinese used concurrently. The two symbols of authority of the *daruγaci*, the tablet (*gerege*) and the seal (*tamγa* ~ *tamγa*) both show the cultural influence of China.

3) In the Chinese sources *hsing-sheng* “regional commander”, *liu-shou* “vice-gerent, governor of the capital or of the district capital”, and *chang-kuan* “senior or chief officer” are often used interchangeably, as in the case of Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu. He is called *liu-shou* in *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 9b; *hsing-sheng* in the *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 5b *et passim*, *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 23a, and *Yüan-shih* 150, 18a; and *chang-kuan* in *Kuo-ch’ao wen-lei* 57, 13a. Ja’far is referred to as *hsing-sheng*, *liu-shou*, *hsüan-ch’ai* and *tu-daruγaci*. For *chang-kuan* = *daruγaci* see *Yüan-shih* 7, 20b *et passim*; Yeh Tzu-ch’i, *Ts’ao-mu-tzu* (1762 ed.) 3, 28a (cf. Cleaves, *HJAS* 16, 250). See also *Yüan-shih* 151, 13b, where it is stated that “*chang-kuan* was the highest rank at the beginning of the [Mongol] state”. On *hsüan-ch’ai* = *daruγaci* see Yao Ts’ung-wu, *loc.cit.*, and Schurmann, “Mongolian Tributary Practices”, 320. In view of this, the list of *daruγaci* (*ta-lu-hua-ch’ib*) in the *Yüan-shih* prepared by Jagchid (*op.cit.*, 377-408) cannot be used for statistical purposes.

proceeded to appoint subordinate officials in charge of specific duties and in this way introduced again the traditional paraphernalia of Chinese bureaucracy.

Thus, the office of *daruyaci*, one of the most important in the Mongol administration of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in China, Central and Western Asia, was first instituted as a result of the contact between the nomadic invaders and the sedentary society of China. Han and sinified officials were instrumental in its establishment and, in Cinggis Qan's time, many of them were put in charge of it.¹⁾

Since the Mongols themselves were not concerned with the administration in its more technical aspect, but rather with the material advantages that it provided, it is doubtful whether, except for the Chinese titles already in use among the nobility, they themselves adopted at this stage new Chinese designations.²⁾

1) As is well known, Cinggis appointed *daruyaci* in Central Asia during his Western Campaign, the first reference to such an event being s.a. 1221. See the *Hsi-yu chi*, A, 30a; Waley, 85; Barthold, 401. However, the earliest reference to this office in China in its Mongolian form is s.a. 1215. See *Yüan-shih* 150, 2a (Biography of Shih-mo Yehhsien. In the Biography of An-mu-hai, *ibid.* 122, 12a, the appointment of this official as *daruyaci* of catapult-hands in all districts is recorded s.a. 1214. However, from the context it appears that he was appointed after this date.). But the first *hsing-sheng* was established in 1214, and *chang-kuan* were appointed from the beginning of the invasion, hence the office of *daruyaci*, although unattested in this form, probably goes back to 1212-3. From the *Yüan-shih* it appears that in Cinggis Qan's time these bailiffs were recruited largely from local people (i.e. the Khitan, Chinese, and Jurchen defectors) or foreigners like Ja'far. In Central Asia too this office was filled by non-Mongols like Yeh-lü A-hai, who was made governor of Samarqand in 1220, and the Khwarezmian Mahmüd Yalawac and his son Mas'üd, who were afterwards put in charge of the administration in Transoxiana. See *Yüan-shih* 150, 10a; *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 46, 3a, and 49, 2a; *Secret History* § 263 (the relevant section has been translated by Cleaves, *op. cit.*, 241-4); Juvaini, 97 and n. 3. On the *daruyaci* (in Persian *šahna*) of Central and Western Asia see also *ibid.* 44 n. 3 and 173; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Ed., II (Leiden-London, 1961), 162-3. The first *daruyaci* of Korea, appointed by the Mongols in 1232, was also a Khitan. See Ledyard in *Phi Theta Papers* 6 (1961), 6, 10 and 16 n. 42. In an interesting edict issued to Korea in 1268 are listed the duties of a vassal country to the Mongols as defined by Cinggis Qan. These included sending hostages, assisting the army, contributing supplies, setting up postal stations, taking the census and "establishing *daruyaci*" (*Yüan Kao-li chi-shih* [Kuang-ts'ang-hsüeh-chün ts'ung-shu ed.], 13a). See *HJAS* 15 (1952), 512-13, and Henthorn, 194 ff.

2) Besides titles like *t'ai-shih* and *kuo-wang*, which had become part of Mongolian nomenclature, the Mongols certainly became acquainted with other Chinese titles

Conclusion

The election of Ögödei in 1229 and the appointment of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai as chief administrator of North China represent a new era in Sino-Mongol relations. Outwardly, Chinese influence reached an unprecedented level in the early 'thirties, when Chinese administrative practices were adopted in the conquered territory, under the direction of a court-appointed secretariat (*chung-shu-sheng*) headed by the famous sinicized Khitan Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's well-known reforms were aimed at rationalizing the exploitation of the country and introducing a division of administrative authority. They culminated in the selective examinations of 1237.¹⁾ Actually, the establishment of the *chung-shu-sheng* at Qara-Qorum merely formalized—chiefly for the benefit of the Chinese subjects—the status and functions of the *bicēci*.²⁾

and office designations, but they appear to have made little use of them. In the *Secret History* § 252, we find the term *liu-shou* in Mongolian transcription (*liüsü*), but it occurs only as the designation of a Chin official. Chang Jung, the Chinese naval engineer and ballistic expert in their service, was appointed in 1223 *p'ao-shui-shou yüan-shuai* or general in charge of catapults and navy, but Cinggis, and no doubt the other Mongols, called him simply Usuci "Waterman" (*Yüan-shih* 151, 19b). In fact, quite a number of defectors received nicknames, and I think these were their only current appellations in the Mongolian society. I-la Nieh-erh was called by Cinggis Pa-chou Yüan-shuai because he came from Pa-chou; Wang Hsün was nicknamed Qara Yüan-shuai "Black General" on account of his dark skin; Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was styled Urtu Saqal "Long Beard" because of his long moustache, etc. The meeting of the two cultures gave rise, however, to a hybrid terminology, instances of which have been preserved in the sources of the period. Thus we find combinations like *tu-daruγaci* and *ta-daruγaci* (= *yeke daruγaci*) "governor general" (*Yüan-shih* 90, 26a; 120, 7a; 124, 10b), *fu-daruγaci* "vice-governor" (*ibid.* 85, 11a et *passim*; cf. Cleaves, *op. cit.*, 254), *chin nököör* "golden comrade" (see *above*, p. 132, n. 2), and *hsien-kün baqsi* "Immortal Master"—the appellation of Li Chih-ch'ang (Ts'ai Mei-piao, 3 and n. 1; cf. Pelliot, *TP* 28 [1931], 416-7). For other examples see F. W. Cleaves in *HJAS* 13 (1950), 118 n. 123. These hybrid names and terms require further study.

1) On the establishment of the *chung-shu-sheng* in 1231 and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's administrative reforms see my "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai", 203-7; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, *passim*; *ibid.*, "Mongolian Tributary Practices", 361 ff. An excellent account of the selective examinations of 1237 is found in Abe, 887-93.

2) The three top officials of the *chung-shu-sheng*—the Khitan Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*chung-shu-ling*), the Kereit Cinqai (*tso-ch'eng-hsiang*) and the Jurchen Nien-ho Chung-shan (*yu-ch'eng-hsiang*)—were all *bicēci*. See the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 2a. Cinqai was Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's senior assistant. His Chinese title is given in the *Yüan-shih* 2, 2b, and 120, 10b, as *yu-ch'eng-hsiang*, but in the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*, 81a, it appears as *tso-*

And, as indicated earlier, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's reform program, hailed later as a momentous innovation, was just an extension and generalization of practices already introduced on a limited scale in the districts controlled by the Han military leaders.

However, the progressive feudalization of the country had alienated the court from the provinces, hence Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's major efforts were actually directed towards finding means of gaining a measure of control over the apanaged territories. He had to contend with widespread opposition. The Mongol nobility, in spite of the new fiscal regulations, continued to send envoys at irregular intervals to collect the *ch'ai-fa*. Many of these were Inner Asian Moslems in the conquerors' pay, whose ranks had swollen after the Khwarezmian war. Moreover, all sorts of people, Chinese and foreigners, who succeeded in gaining a superficial knowledge of Mongolian could act as interpreters and collect revenue. Their number was apparently considerable.¹⁾ The

ch'eng-hsiang. This discrepancy can be explained by the following passage from Cinqai's epitaph composed by the great scholar Hsü Yu-jen (1287-1364): "When the *chung-shu-sheng* was established for the first time, as the left [side] was honoured, His Excellency (i.e. Cinqai) was appointed *tso-ch'eng-hsiang*. When, shortly afterwards, the right [side] was preferred, [his office] was changed to *yu-ch'eng-hsiang*." (*Kuei-t'ang hsiao-kao* [San-i-t'ang ts'ung-shu ed.] 10, 6b.) Apparently the Mongol administration, on the advice of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, had at first adopted the Chinese custom, followed also by the Liao and Chin dynasties, of honouring the left. Later, however, the Mongols gave preference to the right in conformity with their own custom. Thus, Cinqai, being the senior of the two assistants, had been initially appointed left prime minister; afterwards his office was changed to that of right prime minister. This change naturally affected Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's junior assistant Nien-ho Chung-shan, whose original office of *yu-ch'eng-hsiang*, also recorded in the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*, 81a, was subsequently changed to that of *tso-ch'eng-hsiang*, in which form it is attested in *Yüan-shih* 2, 2b, and 146, 12b. While the *Yüan-shih* has recorded the Chinese titles held by Cinqai and Chung-shan in their final form, the Mongol source of which the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu* is a translation has evidently recorded only the earlier version.

1) On the role of interpreters and translators see the *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, 11b-12a, and *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 8b. On the basis of these sources, Ledyard (*JAO* 83, 226-7) stated that "most of the interpreters and translators who travelled with the Mongol armies in eastern Asia were Jürçen defectors". This is not quite correct. These texts refer almost invariably to "Chin officials", and these, as we know, included Jurchens, Khitans and Chinese. The two "Jurchen men" who according to the *Meng-Ta pei-lu* acted as interpreters for Muqali were in fact a Khitan and a Chinese, as pointed out by Wang Kuo-wei (*ibid.*, 11b). The passage in the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh* has been translated

clergy, by now a powerful body in its own right, and practically enjoying full tax-exemption, was opposed to any move that might undermine its privileged status.¹⁾

But more than the hostility, overt or indirect, of individual pressure groups at the Mongol court, what caused the failure of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's program of reforms in the latter part of Ögödei's reign was the inevitable process of feudalization.²⁾ This, paradoxically enough, was accelerated by the very people whose assistance Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai needed most in carrying out his policies: the Han military leaders and overlords. Let us consider this question more in detail.

Ögödei's first task upon his enthronement as *qaγan* was to complete the conquest of Chin and bring to a speedy end the war begun by his father twenty years earlier. In order to carry out this vast military operation, Ögödei made full use of the Han army, which he divided for the purpose into three divisions (left, right and centre), led respectively by the Khitan Hsiao Cha-la-erh (*Jalar) and the two Chinese, Liu Ni (Hei-ma) and Shih T'ien-tse. The three generals were given the rank of *wan-hu* or myriarch, and were placed under the general command of Yeh-lü T'u-hua.³⁾ The appointment of these officials as *wan-hu* was the logical development of the situation described in the previous pages. By 1229-1230 the Han leaders had become so powerful in their

by Cleaves in *HJAS* 14 (1951), 504. Cf., however, Ledyard's comments, *loc. cit.*, 232-3. On the early activity of the Moslem businessmen and envoys see *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 11a-14b, and Schurmann's translation of the relevant sections in "Mongolian Tributary Practices", 312-3. For a good description of their abusive practices see the edict of 13 September 1237 quoted in the section on the postal service (*chan-ch'ih*) in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* (Tōyō-bunko sōkan ed.; Tokyo, 1930) 19416, 8b-9a. Cf. also Sun K'o-k'uan in *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 8 (1954), 278-81, and Murakami Shōji in *Tōhō-gakubō* 13 (1942), 143-96. The local population often could not distinguish between "envoys" (*elcid*) and *daruγaci*, since they were all engaged in the collection of levies. Hence, the term *hsüan-ch'ai*, which we have discussed earlier, was indiscriminately applied in this period to both kinds of officials. Cf. Jagchid, 296-7.

1) This is clearly shown by the opposition of the Buddhist authorities to having the clergy subjected to an examination on the scriptures. See the *Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai* 21, 703c-704a, and my "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai", 206-7.

2) See *ibid.*, 207-8; Abe, 893 ff.

3) On these events see *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 4, 4a ff.; *Meng-ku Han-chün yü Han wen-hua yen-chiu*, 3 ff.; and the biographies of these personages.

domains that they could furnish a contingent of ten-thousand troops (an approximate figure of course) and could therefore qualify for the rank of *tümen-ü noyan*=*wan-hu*. Consequently, they were given this rank upon the accession of the new emperor.¹⁾ In the following years more Chinese leaders were made *wan-hu*, notably Yen Shih and Chang Jou, the two overlords of Shantung, and after 1234 Hao Ho-shang, Ti Shun, Liang Ying, Wang Chen and Meng Te.²⁾ Under these myriarchs were appointed chiliarchs (*ch'ien-hu*) and centurions (*pai-hu*) selected from the officials in charge of the *chou* and *hsien* in the myriarch's domain. Thus, an overlord like Yen Shih held concurrently the offices of *wan-hu* and *kuan-min chang-kuan* "chief official in charge of the people (=civil affairs)"—i.e. *daruyaci*—of the *hsing-sheng* of Tung-p'ing lu. Under him were eight *ch'ien-hu*, each of whom was the *chang-kuan* of a *chou*. On them depended the *chang-kuan* of the *hsien*.³⁾ In fact, the system developed into a feudal organization in which the myriarchs were the immediate vassals of the ruler, the chiliarchs in turn were the vassals of the myriarchs and so on. Each local "chief official" became a vassal lord endowed with land and subjects. By the middle 'thirties each common man in North China "belonged" to one or other of the Mongol, Khitan and Chinese military leaders.

From the Chinese point of view, this situation altered considerably the significance and functions of the *hsing-sheng*, *tsung-kuan fu*, etc. These regional and local administrations were no longer conquered districts placed under the military governorship of a representative of the

1) According to the Mongol custom, all the ranks and titles held by the officers, whether Mongol or foreign, had to be confirmed by each new emperor upon his enthronement. Promotions and demotions were also made on this occasion. See *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 51, 12a. The promotion of the Khitan and Chinese officials to the rank of *wan-hu* must be related to the presentation of the census lists to the court in 1228. See *above*, p. 131, n. 1. It was on the strength of the population figures contained in these registers, as well as on the military skill of these officials, that Ögödei conferred on them the highest military office.

2) See *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, 25a-b; *Meng-wu-erb shih-chi* 51, 2a (Biography of Liu Ni); and the biographies of the officials in question.

3) See *I-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi* 26, 3b; *Yüan-shih* 148, 19a (on Yen Shih's office of *kuan-min chang-kuan*). On the identification of the *ch'ien-hu* under Yen Shih see Abe, 897 ff.

Mongol court, but administrations of fiefs whose revenues were collected and absorbed by the feudal lord and his vassals. A military feudalism of this kind, resulting from the imposition of the military system of the Mongols on Chinese society, was a major factor in keeping the civil authority in the hands of the military, since the ranks of myriarchs, chiliarch, etc. were hereditary. Furthermore, while the Chinese overlords shared Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's sinophile attitude and encouraged the revival and promotion of native culture in their own domains, they too resented, as their Mongol counterparts and the clergy, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's interference in their affairs.¹⁾ The identification of the Han leaders with the apauved Mongolian aristocracy not only deprived Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai of a logical ally, but contributed greatly to perpetuating a situation that he was assiduously trying to change.²⁾

From this brief survey of a little studied aspect of the early Sino-Mongol contacts we may draw certain tentative conclusions:

1. The Mongol conquest of North China (1211-1234) was not as Mongol a conquest as is generally assumed. It was a carefully planned campaign carried out with the expert advice and substantial support of a large group of Khitan, Chinese, and to a lesser extent, Jurchen defectors and their followers. It is my contention that without their aid the Mongol army, fighting on unfamiliar ground, under conditions totally different from those of Mongolia, and against a numerically superior enemy, would not have been able to obtain the surrender of the major Chin towns and fortresses in the border region and Liaoning and thereby establish a firm

1) See *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 57, 13a-b. Government officials were appointed to all the district capitals of the Han overlords when Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai established tax collection bureaus in the ten *lu* in 1230.

2) During the latter part of Ögödei's reign, the Mongols themselves became aware of the dangers inherent in the establishment of a powerful Chinese military élite enjoying the same privileges as the Mongolian nobility. The curtailment of their domains following the re-distribution of fiefs in 1236, and the subsequent appointment of Moslem officials in key administrative posts in China were among the measures taken by the court to meet this problem. The anti-Han movement of the next two decades is a complex question and cannot be discussed here.

foothold in North China from which to launch further attacks. Thus, the defection of Khitan and Chinese officials serving the Chin government was a major cause of the collapse of the dynasty.

2. The causes for the defection of these officials were the hereditary enmity of the Khitan leaders towards their Jurchen masters and the weak ties of loyalty binding the Han subjects to the Chin dynasty. This question requires further investigation.¹⁾
3. In their capacity as allied military leaders, the defectors were regarded by the Mongol court as equal in status to the *nököd*. Therefore, they were granted the same privileges in China as those enjoyed by the *nököd* in the Mongolian society. By virtue of these privileges the territories placed under their military control eventually became their private domains.
4. The Khitan and Chinese military leaders who became overlords re-introduced Chinese practices in the administration of their fiefs, but within a feudal framework which reflected the Mongol social order and military system.
5. The Chinese cultural tradition was kept alive and encouraged in this period through the activity of the pro-Han faction at the Mongol court, represented chiefly by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the Taoist societies (mainly the Ch'üan-chen sect), and the Khitan and Chinese overlords. However, political and economic factors intimately related to the feudal situation that obtained in China gradually alienated these groups from one another. The breach within the Han camp was in turn one of the main factors accounting for the limited acculturation of the Mongols in the following decades.

BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES

Abbreviations

- C 沈澐 常山貞石志 (1842)
 H 柯劭忞 新元史 (1922)
 I 元好問 遺山先生文集 四部叢刊
 K 蘇天爵 國朝文類 四部叢刊
 M 屠寄 蒙兀兒史記 (1934)

1) I shall discuss this problem in a forthcoming paper on Sino-Jurchen relations and the rise of nationalism in North China in the twelfth century.

- S 脫脫等 宋史 百衲本
 T 宇文懋昭 大金國志 萬有文庫
 Y 宋濂等 元史 百衲本
 CC 王惲 秋澗先生大全集 四部叢刊
 CF 李鴻章等 畿輔通志 商務印書館
 CJ 耶律楚材 湛然居士文集 四部叢刊
 CY 李心傳 建炎以來朝野雜記 乙集 叢書集成
 HT 彭大雅 徐霆 黑韃事略 海寧王靜安先生遺書
 HY 李志常 西遊記 海寧王靜安先生遺書
 MA 姚燧 牧庵集 四部叢刊
 MT 趙琪 蒙韃備錄 海寧王靜安先生遺書
 ST 畢沅 阮元 山左金石志 (1797)
 SY 胡聘元 山右石刻叢編 (1901)
 YA 李庭 寓庵集 藉香零拾
 YC 蘇天爵 元朝名臣事略 叢書集成
 YS 曾廉 元書 (1910)
 YT 蔡美彪 元代白話碑集錄 (科學出版社 北京 1955)

- AO-T'UN Shih-ying 奧屯世英 Y 151, 16a; H 151, 2a; M 47, 10a
 CHANG Jou 張柔 Y 147, 1a; H 139, 1a; M 51, 7b; YC 6, 75;
 HT, 25a; I 26, 10b; CF 168, 6243
 YS 29, 9b
 CHANG Lin 張林 Y 151, 19b; H 147, 12b; M 59, 6b
 CHANG Jung 張榮 Y 150, 18a; H 140, 1a; M 52, 11b
 CHANG Jung² 張榮 Y 150, 14b; H 145, 3a; M 56, 1b.
 CHAO Chin 趙璿 Y 152, 18a; H 143, 9a; M 42, 1a.
 CHAO Jou 趙柔 Y 151, 7a; H 145, 5a; M 56, 1a
 CHAO Ti 趙迪 H 146, 5b; M 51, 5a; MA 16, 20a; K 62, 14b
 CHIA-KU Ch'ang-ko 夾谷常哥 HY, B, 11b; YA 6, 64b-65a.
 CHIA-KU T'ung-chu 夾谷通住 M 60, 4b; SY 26, 17a; 28, 30a
 CHIN HO 靳和 H 145, 16b; M 60, 4b; SY 27, 23a
 CHOU Hsien-ch'en 周獻臣 Y 150, 13a; H 148, 1a; M 53, 3a
 HAO Ho-shang 郝和尙 Y 150, 3b; H 148, 3a; M 51, 17a
 HO Po-hsiang 何伯祥 Y 150, 11a; H 147, 4a; M 56, 8b
 HO Shih 何實 M 51, 4a; MT, 10b
 HSIAO Cha-la-erh 蕭札刺兒 Y 149, 19b; H 135, 4b; M 49, 4b
 I-LA Nieh-erh 移刺捏兒 Y 149, 11a; H 146, 6b; M 59, 1a
 KUO Pao-yü 郭寶玉 Y 149, 12b; H 146, 6b; M 59, 2b
 KUO Te-hai 郭德海 S 476, A-B; YS 29, 7b; C 13, 35a
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